Volume 14: Number 3: July 2007
Navigation and Seamanship
Bridge teams fail to avoid collision
The International Group of P&I Clubs has been monitoring casualties involving pilots for some years. In respect of collisions, a recent analysis found that fourteen serious collisions occurred each year under pilotage and that on average the cost was US$800,000.
The recent case of the SKAGERN colliding with the SAMSKIP COURIER is a perfect example of the failures highlighted by the International Group analysis.
On 7 June 2006, the general cargo ship SKAGERN and the container ship SAMSKIP COURIER collided in the Humber estuary in dense fog.
SAMSKIP COURIER was a new purposebuilt container vessel of 7,852GT which had been in service only six weeks since her delivery from the builder's yard, during that time she had been plying between Rotterdam and Hull.
SKAGERN, a 23 year old general cargo vessel of 4,451GT, had been a regular fortnightly visitor to the River Humber since 1987.
On the day in question, SKAGERN was inward bound to Hull, with a cargo of timber and copper. Visibility was moderate, about 2 to 3 miles, but was forecast to deteriorate. SKAGERN'S bridge team consisted of the Master, second officer and an AB. The pilot had conduct of the ship and was steering by autopilot from the starboard side of the bridge console, with the Master at the engine controls on the port side. The second officer was plotting positions, while the AB was acting as lookout. On picking up the pilot there were no vessels visible on the radar; however, the pilot had informed the Master that an outbound ship, SAMSKIP COURIER, was further up the estuary. SKAGERN proceeded up the Humber estuary at a speed 10 - 10.5kts; despite the reduced visibility, no sound signal was sounded.
At 22:41 SAMSKIP COURIER left the King George Dock, Hull. On the bridge were her Master, a pilot, and an ordinary seaman (OS) acting as lookout and standby helmsman. Visibility was between 1 and 2 cables. Once SAMSKIP COURIER was in the river and heading downstream, her pilot asked for the steering to be put on autopilot, and took over the con. The Master was at the starboard side of the console. At the pilot's request, SAMSKIP COURIER'S speed was increased to slow ahead (almost 9kts). At 22:47 she subsequently increased speed to half ahead. The pilot of SAMSKIP COURIER spoke to SKAGERN'S pilot on a mobile telephone, they spent approximately 1½ minutes discussing the vessels' respective positions and the visibility. At this time, SKAGERN was 4.5 miles down river from SAMSKIP COURIER.
When SKAGERN was at a range of 2.25 miles (6 minutes away) and its target just appearing on SAMSKIP COURIER'S radar screen, the pilot on the SAMSKIP COURIER advised the Master that the engine speed could be increased to half ahead. The ship's speed quickly built up to almost 13kts. on a course of 136º. Over the next 0.5 mile, the pilot gave a series of incremental alterations on the autopilot to gradually bring the ship's head around to 152º. This gradual alteration allowed SAMSKIP COURIER to avoid being set down on the Sand End light buoy but caused her to edge across to the inbound (north side) of the channel. Both SAMSKIP COURIER's radars had ARPA capability but neither were activated.
SKAGERN picked up SAMSKIP COURIER on her port side radar at a range of 2.25 miles. Again, ARPA was available but not utilised. At 22:55, SKAGERN'S pilot made a routine position call on VHF radio to VTS Humber.
Fifteen seconds after hearing SKAGERN'S communication with VTS, SAMSKIP COURIER'S pilot requested a speed reduction from half ahead (12k). However, instead of reducing to slow ahead, as requested, the Master reduced to only 36% power, which gave a speed reduction of only about 1kt. By this time, the ships were clearly visible on each other's radar. When 0.8 mile apart, the Master of SAMSKIP COURIER put his radar's electronic bearing line (EBL) onto 162º, (their next course heading after clearing Sand End light buoy), to establish if the ship was clear to alter to starboard onto the new heading. The EBL showed that they were, indeed, clear of the light buoy, and the Master was expecting the pilot to bring her round at any second.When the ships were 0.62 mile apart, the Master reduced speed further to 30% power, without telling the pilot. However, this was still in excess of the speed that the pilot had requested earlier. Visibility was slightly less than 1.25 cables.
SKAGERN'S Master monitored SAMSKIP COURIER'S approach on his radar and observed she was not altering to starboard to pass down their port side as he expected. However, with the pilot having the conduct of the vessel the Master was not unduly concerned.
At 22:57:34, when 4.25 cables apart SAMSKIP COURIER'S pilot called up SKAGERN on VHF channel 12 and enquired if they were keeping close to the red buoys. SKAGERN'S pilot informed him that he was on the north (correct) side of the channel. SAMSKIP COURIER'S pilot replied immediately, and confirmed that they were also on that same side of the channel. Despite emergency helm and engine movements the collision occurred one minute later.
Minutes before the collision, one of SKAGERN'S forward mooring party had just received a text message on his mobile telephone, and this delayed the party going forward to the bow.Without that text the mooring party would have been on the foc'sle at the time of the collision.
Pilot/Master exchange
The pilot boarded the SAMSKIP COURIER at 21:45. A brief exchange of information then took place between him and the Master, and this was heard on the ship's VDR. The Master ascertained that the pilot had never been on SAMSKIP COURIER or her sister ships before. The pilot placed his pilot list and passage plan on the chart table, but did not discuss these with the Master. The Master did not become aware of these documents until the pilot was disembarking from the ship. The pilot list showed that SKAGERN was inbound for King George Dock. The pilot, however, did not verbally inform the Master that they would meet SKAGERN during their outbound passage. A chart of the Humber was on the chart table, but no passage plan was drawn on it. The ship's pilot card, was not handed to the pilot, but was instead placed on the console by the port side radar. From leaving the lock, the pilot had the con. Little dialogue passed between him and the Master as the ship proceeded outbound. The pilot felt the Master's English was not very good, and he believed there was little point in entering into discussion with regard to the inbound SKAGERN, and therefore did not mention the ship.
SKAGERN took her pilot on board at the Spurn light buoy at 20:55. Following an exchange with the officer of the watch, the pilot was then shown the engine controls, the autopilot and the tiller by the Master. The ship's pilot card was also made available to the pilot. The Master did not recollect being shown a passage plan by the pilot, who thought he had laid it down on the bridge console. After the accident, the passage plan could not be found anywhere on the bridge.
Cause of the accident
The accident was primarily caused by a failure to apply long established collision avoidance procedures by the Masters and pilots of both ships. SAMSKIP COURIER failed to keep to the starboard side of the channel as she approached and rounded Sand End light buoy. This error was exacerbated by the fact that both ships were travelling at an unsafe speed for the prevailing conditions, in circumstances which allowed little time, or room, for avoiding action when it became apparent that a serious situation had developed.
Poor bridge team interaction, exacerbated by poor communications between key persons, played a major role in the accident. This was highlighted by the Masters' total trust in their pilots, and their reticence to take navigational control when it became apparent that an emergency situation was developing.
The pilot of SAMSKIP COURIER lost situational awareness at a critical moment which, in turn, contributed to ineffectual decision making culminating in the collision.
Nevertheless, the ships were the Masters' responsibility, and querying pilots' actions is an appropriate and necessary part of bridge team interaction. If nothing else, the ship Masters should have queried the speed of their vessels given the visibility, confined waterway and converging vessels.
Sand End light buoy, created a slight 'knuckle' and constriction in the channel. It was therefore not the best place for two ships to meet.
Given the restricted visibility, it would have been appropriate to increase the watch on the SKAGERN with a helmsman steering. The Bridge Procedures Manual made no mention of using a helmsman in restricted visibility, but rather left such issues to the Master's discretion. This poses the question: if a helmsman is not going to be used in shallow confined waters, in restricted visibility, with expected traffic, when would one be used? The pilot did not question the bridge manning level.
It was considered that the bridge manning level on SAMSKIP COURIER was inappropriate for the prevailing conditions and estuary passage.
Both ships appeared to be using their pilot as a part of the navigational watch - effectively as a member of the bridge team. The composition of the watch (bridge team) should not differ just because there is a pilot on board.
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For a bridge team to work effectively, each member of the team must know precisely their duties. This can be achieved by holding an arrival/departure briefing at which each member of the team is informed of the plan and their role in it. This has the advantage that everyone is clear about each other's responsibilities. On this occasion, no such briefing took place on either ship, with pilot/Master exchange being minimal. Bridge Team Management training is not mandatory, but is highly desirable for ship Masters and pilots. Both pilots had attended bridge team management training courses during the 15 months preceding the accident. Neither Master had ever received any formal bridge team management training. |
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The full MAIB report into the collision can be seen at http://www.maib.gov.uk
Voyage data recorders (VDRs) - are designed to record and store navigational data which can be crucial in the event of an onboard incident.
Since 1 July 2002, under SOLAS 1974 chapter V, the installation of VDRs or S-VDRs (simplified voyage data recorders) has been mandatory on all passenger vessels and Ro-Ros as well as all ships of 3,000gt, or above, built from that date. A rolling programme of retro-fitting VDRs or S-VDRs on older vessels during scheduled drydock periods means that by 1 July 2010, every vessel of over 3000GT should be fitted with a VDR or S-VDR.The propagation of VDR technology, and its use in retrieving evidence post-incident, has revealed a number of problems which have been identified by investigators who have been appointed by the Association following collisions, groundings or other similar incidents.These issues can be summarised as follows;
- Masters and crews are unfamiliar with the use of the VDR equipment carried onboard their vessels. Currently there are a number of manufacturers supplying VDRs and the actual operation of the equipment varies in each case. In some operation manuals the wording can be quite technical and difficult to follow. It is advisable therefore for Masters and other relevant officers and crew members to have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the VDR on board. It would be helpful to have simplified instructions on the operation of key functions of the VDR posted next to the unit for use in an emergency.
- VDRs have the capacity to store the data being recorded for a maximum period of 12 hours, thereafter the data is 'lost'. Therefore, in the event of an incident, the data must be 'backed up' (downloaded from the VDR) as soon as possible otherwise the data will be lost. The process for saving the data is usually as straight forward as pressing and holding one or two buttons. However, these buttons should be clearly marked and readily identifiable.
- The data extracted from the VDR will only be as good as the information which it was recording. It is no good if targets are being plotted on the starboard radar when in fact it is information from the port radar which is being recorded. Identification of navigation equipment which is connected to the VDR can be ascertained when the VDR is being tested.Navigation equipment can then be clearly marked accordingly. If in doubt the Master should seek the attendance of a certified technician.
- Before recorded data can be viewed, files may require compressing and decompressing and a large capacity memory stick is often required for transferring the sizable files from the VDR hard drive.The viewing software may require a security code before it can be run which is often only available directly from the manufacturer.
- In the unlikely event that there is a problem with downloading the stored data, a technician may be able to access the VDR hard drive and restore data that appears to be lost.
- The best way to identify any potential problems with the VDR system is to perform a test of the equipment with a qualified technician present, taking the Master and crew though the entire download procedure.Notes can then be produced which are easily understood and can be followed in the future. If this is not practical, Masters should have quick access to superintendants who are familiar with the process and who can explain the procedure to the Master.
Traffic separation scheme violation due to oversight - MARS 200732
A medium-sized LPG tanker was navigating through an inshore lane in a North Sea traffic separation scheme, answering routine questions from the Coast Guard relating to the vessel, her cargo and destination. Upon confirming the gross tonnage of the vessel, the Coast Guard officer informed the vessel that she was in violation of the navigational rules relating to the use of the traffic separation system (TSS), as her gross tonnage was greater than that permitted for the inshore scheme. The Master offered to manoeuvre the vessel into the correct traffic lane but the Coast Guard advised that, as the violation had already taken place, a penalty would be imposed and that should the vessel undertake the remedial action proposed, the vessel would be infringing other TSS rules and would then be liable for additional penalties.
The vessel continued her voyage without encountering further problems and was boarded by PSC officers on berthing at her destination,where a fine was imposed on the vessel for the offence.
On reinspecting the navigational charts and publications shortly after the Coast Guard's notification, the Master was able to confirm that the vessel had indeed violated local regulations by using the inshore traffic separation scheme.The officer who created the voyage plan, the Master who had authorised it and the other watch-keeping officers who had endorsed it, had all missed this important information.
In mitigation the Master explained to the PSC officers that the vessel was on short-sea trades and that the workload on the officer responsible for creating voyage plans was high. In fact, it turned out the officer concerned was in breach of STCW regulations relating to the hours of rest due to the nature of the trade.
Lessons learnt
This incident fortunately resulted in no more than a small fine. When planning their passage, navigators are reminded of the necessity of checking all information relating to the intended voyage, including rules and regulations as stated on charts and other nautical publications pertaining to the area to be transited, as well as temporary and preliminary notices to mariners and notifications received from any other bona fide sources.
Before beginning the voyage, the Master and if practicable, other deck officers, should carefully recheck and ensure that the passage plan is in compliance with all regulations.
If there is a situation whereby the workload of the vessel becomes extreme and excessive hours are being worked, then the shore-based management should be advised, so that additional resources may be allocated, as deemed necessary.
Important differences between ECDIS and ECS
An important distinction between ECDIS and ECS has been highlighted by the head of navigation safety at the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
ENCs (electronic navigational charts) comply with specific standards and when used on an approved ECDIS system will meet SOLAS requirements for the carriage of charts. ECS (electronic chart systems) do not. It is the case that ECS apparently functions in much the same way as ECDIS and users tend to rely upon them to the same extent and to the same degree.
ECS systems are not necessarily unreliable but they are cheaper and do not have to conform with the same regulatory requirements as ECDIS. Safety at Sea International magazine has recently quoted Joe Collins, the head of navigation safety at the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (UK): 'A nautical chart is used officially by, or on the authority of, a government, authorised hydrographic office or other relevant government institution and is designed to meet the requirements of marine navigation. So a fully compliant ECDIS,with proper back-up and using ENCs, can satisfy this carriage requirement. An ECS cannot do so; if a shipowner chooses to fit such a system, it can only be used as a navigational aid.The paper chart remains the official document and if the misuse of the ECS was a causal factor in an accident, the owners may find themselves in a legal quandary'. Vessels using ECS should do so only to supplement navigation based on the, fully up to date, paper chart portfolio.
A warning therefore is appropriate that, whereas many ECS systems are very good, the official requirement is that they are not used for the full range of navigation tasks such as route planning and monitoring.Most obviously there is a need to record positions and routes taken on the paper chart.
The advice given is clearly important, firstly or its own sake i.e. the maximisation of navigational efficiency, but also in respect of port state control who may choose to look closely at those ships using ECS rather thanECDIS and enquire as to whether the paper charts are fully up to date and have been used for the full range of navigational tasks.
Safety at Sea International - April 2007
Safety
Free fall lifeboat seat allocation
The Nautical Institute Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS) advises companies and Masters on vessels equipped with free fall lifeboats to ensure that the two vital seating positions in the boat are allocated to the most experienced, appropriate crew members.The advice notes that on some ships,whilst the senior deck officer has been assigned the coxswain's seat in a free fall lifeboat, the seat from where the emergency release mechanism can be operated has been inadvertently left unassigned or has been allocated to a supernumerary.This emergency release operating mechanism is usually located near the stern of the boat. In the event that the main lifeboat release mechanism, operated from the coxswain's seat, fails to launch the lifeboat, it is vital that the responsible person, seated near the emergency release mechanism control, operates this promptly under the coxswain's orders, to ensure a safe and quick abandonment from the stricken ship.
Crew Matters
Immigration fines in the USA
The Association has recently been advised of a fine of US$3,000 imposed on a ship following a call at the port of Savannah. Briefly, the circumstances of the incident which caused the fine are that the chief engineer of the ship was signing off and two crewmembers were assisting him with his luggage.One of the crewmembers was the subject of a restriction which meant that he was not allowed off the ship whilst the ship was in port as he did not have a visa. However, by stepping ashore, he unwittingly contravened the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Masters are strongly advised to note that the powers of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection are wide-ranging and even an innocent breach of the immigration legislation can render the ship liable to a fine.
Australian maritime crew visa
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The Australian Government has announced that it is introducing a new visa for foreign crew - the Maritime Crew Visa (MCV).With effect from 1 July 2007 all foreign crew will be expected to apply for, and hold, an MCV for their lawful arrival in Australia.There will be a six month transition period from 1 July to 31 December 2007. During this time, oreign crew who arrive without an MCV will remain eligible for the grant of the existing Special Purpose Visa provided they hold the required documentation.The MCV will become mandatory from 1 January 2008. Foreign crew who fail to meet these requirements may not be allowed to leave the ship. In addition, the vessel may be liable to a fine of A$5,000 for each person who is refused immigration clearance. |
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For further details please see the Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship website: http://www.immi.gov.au
Containers and Cargoes
US court condemns shipowner for carrying snow covered steel and failing to record ventilation
It is quite common for both the ship and a cargo of steel to sweat and cause damage to the cargo depending upon various factors.
Officers are well aware of the need to ventilate the cargo and, of course, that ventilation of the holds cannot take place during heavy weather. Should ventilation be prevented by heavy weather for a lengthy period then it is possible that cargo will become damaged and the owner would hopefully be able to demonstrate that ventilation was impossible and avoid liability for that damage. In effect the courts will expect the owners to demonstrate that the damage was inevitable (i.e. unavoidable) by virtue of heavy weather preventing ventilation (in legal terms the defence is known as a 'peril of the sea' defence).
In a recently reported case the ship had loaded a cargo of sensitive galvanised steel coils in one part of the hold but then had gone on to load snow covered steel slabs in an adjacent part of the hold. Similarly hot rolled coils which had been stored on an open quay were loaded near sensitive cold coils.The snow melted during the voyage with the result that the sensitive coils suffered both direct water damage from sitting in pools of melted snow and rusting from condensation - some of which contained salt water.
The court, quoting the principal that the 'peril of the sea' defence was only available when the damage was unavoidable or unforeseeable pointed to the fact that the flooding was entirely foreseeable by virtue of the snow being loaded into the hold along with the slabs.The court also found the condensation foreseeable (presumably on the basis that without the snow the amount of condensation would have been much lower or even negligible). Because no ventilation log had been kept, the court was unable to discern whether ventilation of the hold had been carried out when appropriate during periods of calm weather, and that ventilation had ceased during inappropriate times i.e.whilst the vessel was shipping spray on deck. Further, whilst it was feasible that some of the cargo damage did arise out of inevitable sweat as opposed to the loading of snow into the hold along with the slab cargo, the court declined to attempt to split or apportion the damage between these two causes. As a matter of principal, once the cargo interests had proven that there was negligence on the part of the ship which gave rise to the damage then the burden was upon the ship to prove exactly what proportion of the damage arose from that negligence and what proportion arose from inevitable condensation. Partly because the ship did not keep records of ventilation of the holds they were unable to do so.
Clearly the case provides two lessons to Masters and chief officers.Those steel cargoes which can be, and commonly are, loaded wet or snow covered from quay are well known to Masters and chief officers but they should be aware of the consequences for other,more sensitive cargo within the same hold. Secondly, that officers undertaking ventilation as part of the proper care of the cargo should be aware that in due course such actions, i.e. ventilation, might have to be proven and that by far and away the best way to do this is to record the ventilation either in a rough log book for that purpose or in the deck log book. Specific times of ventilation for each and every hold should be recorded along with the relevant weather conditions and any reasons for either ceasing or recommencing ventilation.Humidity readings inside the holds and outside should be recorded at the same time.
Regulatory Update
Sulphur emission regulations - when do they come into force?
The English Channel/North Sea Sulphur Emission Control Area (SECA) will come into force in the next few months. However, not all authorities have set the same enforcement date.
The European Union (EU) Directive enforcement date is 11 August 2007,while the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Regulation under MARPOL Annex VI sets the date as 22 November 2007.The question is,which set of rules should ships use during those 3 months, taking all factors into consideration?
If the ship has a European flag and that European state has introduced the EU Directive into its law, then the ship is bound by the European law. If a ship is calling at an EU port that has introduced the Directive, then the enforcement date is 11 August.This means that the ship must burn 1.5% sulphur fuel from 11 August when entering and transiting the sew SECA area to the port.
If the ship does not fly an EU state flag and provided it does not go to an EU port or a port governed by the EU Directive (e.g.Norway) then it does not have to comply with the requirements until 22 November.
However, in view of this difference in dates, and to avoid any possible confusion or the risk of port state control interference, the advice from INTERTANKO is to consider the North Sea and English Channel as a SECA with effect from 11 August.
Painkillers - need to declare in US ports
A recent incident in Houston serves as a useful reminder to the Association's Members to ensure that ship's crews remain ever vigilant when drawing up ship's stores declarations.
In the latest incident, the local authorities, when attending onboard upon ship's arrival, noticed that there was a small amount of undeclared paracetamol and codeine tablets on board. It was clear that this was a genuine error and, luckily, the local authorities decided to take no further action and so no penalty was subsequently levied. However, as this particular ship regularly trades from Colombia and is also regarded as a high profile type of vessel (being an LPG carrier), we are advised that it is highly likely that the ship will be subjected to further inspections in the future.
It is encouraging to see that the US authorities took a common sense approach to this particular matter, however this type of incident can serve as a lucrative source of income in many jurisdictions around the world.Members may therefore wish to remind their crews of the need to ensure that ship's stores declarations are accurate and up to date when entering port.
Miscellaneous
Publications
IBC Code, 2007 Edition
IC100E in English. GB£35.00.
Operational Use of AIS, 2006 Edition
T134S in Spanish. GB£40.00.
Wall chart : IMO Dangerous Goods, 2006
IB223E in English. GB£8.00.
LSA Symbols poster, 2006
IB981E in English. GB£8.00.
Full details of these publications and how to order can be found on the IMO website http://www.imo.org
Editor's message
We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk
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