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Oxygen depleting cargoes
After entering a hold, one of them slipped on a cargo of logs which had been stripped of their bark. When the other stevedores went in to try and rescue him, they too were trapped in the deep spaces between the logs. All four were later brought out unconscious and were pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The inherent nature of the cargo, which lead to oxygen depletion in the enclosed space, combined with the slippery surfaces of the logs, created the hazard which led to this tragic incident. Logs are just one of several cargoes which are known to have oxygen depleting properties. This oxygen depletion can be caused by factors such as self-heating of the cargo, oxidation of metals and ores or decomposition of vegetable oils, animal fats, grain and other organic materials or their residues. The materials listed below are known to be capable of causing oxygen depletion:
Failure to observe simple procedures can lead to people being unexpectedly overcome when entering enclosed spaces. While ship’s staff will no doubt be aware of such dangers and will observe sufficient precautions, it is also obligatory on the part of the ship to ensure that cargo holds are well ventilated and that the stevedoring company is warned of inherent dangers with the cargo carried on board before commencement of work. Personal injury warning A recent fatal accident on board an oil tanker entered with the Association reinforces the need for a culture of risk assessment prior to performing any job and in particular the importance of enforcing the permit to work system prior to undertaking any hot work. The accident victim, the 1st Oiler, went to the engine room workshop to make a garbage can from an empty steel drum. The drum had previously contained kerosene. He decided to remove the top of the drum using an electric torch. The heat from the torch ignited the kerosene vapour in the drum, causing an explosion. The Oiler’s clothes were set on fire by the flash from the explosion and he sustained extensive 3rd degree burns. He was hospitalised ashore but subsequently died from his injuries. The Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen, issued by the United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency, deals extensively with the subject of risk assessment, but the space available in this publication does not allow us to go into great detail on the subject. Suffice to say that, had a risk assessment been conducted before the Oiler started work, it would have been readily apparent that there was a potential risk of fire or, as in this case, explosion. The Code states: ‘There are no fixed rules about how risk assessment should be undertaken. The assessment should depend on the type of ship, the nature of operations and the type and extent of the hazards and risks… Risk assessment should be seen as a continuous process; in practice, the risks in the workplace should be assessed before work continues on any task for which no valid risk assessment exists.’ It is not known if the Oiler had been instructed to undertake the job, or had used his own initiative. However, what is clear is that he should have obtained a ‘permit to work’ before commencing the task. If he had done so, it is likely that questions would have been asked as to the safety of the proposed method of making the garbage can and whether there were any potential hazards involved in the job. Had those questions been asked a life would not have been lost. AQIS - Australia maintains its tough stand The Association has previously warned Members of the zero tolerance policy of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) and recommended that the holds of all bulk carriers calling at Australian ports be thoroughly cleaned prior to loading (see Risk Watch Vol.10, No. 2). The Association has now been alerted to a recent incident in which a container ship arriving from New Zealand was ordered to leave Australian waters due to the presence on board of live burnt pine longicorn beetles. The burnt pine longicorn beetle is a seasonal pest resident in New Zealand and various other countries where pine trees are available as a host. In this incident the ship was not allowed to discharge its containers and was ordered to leave Australian waters and not return until it was certified free of infestation. The Association is aware that AQIS has previously intervened in respect of the discharge of individual containers. However, it is reported that this is the first incident in which a container ship has been ordered to leave. Members with ships calling at Australian ports should therefore be aware that container ships will not be exempt from the attentions of AQIS. In addition to ensuring that holds, deck areas and containers are free of mud and grain Members are recommended to check thoroughly for any pests banned by AQIS. Details of AQIS requirements can be found online at www.aqis.gov.au and more specifically regarding import regulations at www.aiccc.com Loading grain (and other moisture sensitive cargoes) in Vancouver, Canada We are grateful to Roger A Day from Shipowners Assurance Management (BC) Ltd, our correspondents in Vancouver, for this article on loading cargo in the rain in Vancouver. At some times of the year on Canada’s west coast, mainly between October and March, Pacific depressions follow one another with monotonous regularity giving rise to many days at a time of overcast skies and continuous light to moderate precipitation interspersed with periods of heavier rain – or snow. Many of the bulk cargoes loaded here, particularly grains, are to some extent moisture sensitive. Masters and ships’ officers are rightly concerned to avoid harming such cargoes by exposing them to extended periods of precipitation. Shutting down cargo operations during these extended periods of precipitation would significantly extend the loading operation. While the first concern must be the condition of the cargo, ‘time is money’ and Masters and officers are therefore expected to avoid undue delays. The exercise of their duties becomes one of balancing possible risk to the cargo against stopping cargo operations unnecessarily. A realistic assessment of the risk to the cargo from rainwater exposure is a useful exercise. The area (in square metres) of the open hatchway when multiplied by the precipitation rate per hour (in millimetres), divided by one thousand, will give the approximate quantity of water (in m. tonnes) that will be added to the cargo loaded during that hour. For example, rain falling at a rate of 3 millimetres per hour (moderate rain) through an open hatch measuring 15 by 20 metres, adds just under one m. tonne of water to the cargo loaded during that hour. If the vessel was loading cargo at 500 m. tonnes per hour (a rate usually exceeded in the port of Vancouver) this would lead to an increase of 0.2% moisture content. (To put this into context, the maximum allowable moisture content for many cargoes is in the region of 14.5% and typically grain is loaded at about 12% moisture content). Clearly a reduction in the area of the open hatch, or an increase in the loading rate, with a constant rate of precipitation, reduces the increase in the moisture content. Most cargoes presented for loading in Vancouver have moisture contents reasonably well below the maximum allowable moisture content and can therefore withstand a modest increase. Some insight into what various precipitation rates look and feel like can be gained by leaving a straight sided container (a crude gauge) exposed to precipitation and noting the rate of accumulated precipitation against the look and feel of the rain that is falling. A rule of thumb is that if the rain would call for the intermittent use of windscreen wipers while driving a car then loading can continue if suitable precautions are adopted. Rain that would call for the operation of high-speed wipers would be heavy enough to curtail cargo operations. Tarpaulins, carefully deployed to avoid rain collecting in ‘bellies’ from which water could be spilled by careless handling, can be useful in reducing the effective hatch opening. Before opening hatches to resume cargo operations following rain or snow, standing water left on the hatch covers should be removed with brooms or squeegees so that it does not spill into the cargo. Generally, avoiding concentrations of water falling into small areas of the cargo is the object of the exercise. So called ‘rain letters’ can be issued by shippers or charterers purporting to hold the Master and the ship free of responsibility for claims arising from loading in the rain but these letters are less than comprehensively worded and would probably provide little protection against third party bill of lading holders in the event of problems with the cargo. There are also problems that sometimes arise over the perceived quality and quantity figures that appear in Mate’s Receipts and bills of lading for grain cargoes loaded in Canada. Ship’s officers cannot be expected to be expert judges of the quality of any particular grain cargo. There are over a dozen different qualities of wheat for instance and similar variations in the quality of other grains handled through Canada’s export elevators. Except in obvious circumstances, for example, where the wrong type of grain is being loaded, or the cargo has an offensive smell or is contaminated with foreign material, ships’ officers usually have neither the experience nor the knowledge to criticise the quality of a grain cargo being loaded. To help the ships’ officers ascertain the quality and also the quantity of grain loaded, Canada’s Federal Government has set up the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC), to ensure that Canadian export grains properly meet sales contract specifications. They also supervise the movement of such cargoes to tide water and their loading. The CGC inspectors are present at all export elevators. Their mandate is to inspect, test and classify all grain cargoes arriving at those elevators and to ensure that cargoes loaded into ships are what is described in the sales contract. They are also charged with the measurement of all such cargoes and the compiling of any records and data that may be required by the Federal Government in the movement and sale of such cargoes. These inspectors will regularly attend on board vessels loading grain cargoes to ensure that the correct cargo is being loaded. They have the authority to suspend loading and, if necessary, remove cargo from a ship that is not within the sales contract specifications and to have it replaced by sound cargo. The CGC inspectors have been found to be extremely reliable and ships’ officers can be confident that if the CGC inspector is satisfied then the quality of the grain being loaded is in accord with the sales contract specification. Similarly, the CGC is responsible for determining the quantity of cargo received at an elevator and loaded into vessels. Their scales are frequently checked for accuracy. Mate’s Receipt quantities for such cargoes are always those determined by the CGC inspectors at the elevator and, for accuracy, are certainly more reliable than any figures ever calculated from, for instance, a carefully carried out draft survey. This does not reduce the responsibility of ships’ officers carefully and conscientiously to monitor the loading of such cargoes. They should immediately bring to the notice of those carrying out the loading any reservations they may have as to the quantity of the cargo being loaded or the quality of a parcel that has been loaded. Due to the unusual meteorological conditions in Vancouver, loading in the rain seems, at times, to be unavoidable. However, it remains the case that the Master is ultimately responsible for determining what precautions should be taken and whether cargo should be protected from the rain, with or without the assistance of a P&I surveyor. Similarly, while the presence of such experts as the CGC inspectors may give some comfort to a Master, it remains the Master’s responsibility to note the apparent condition of the cargo for the purposes of clausing the bills of lading.
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