Volume 11: Number 4: December 2004

Putting By

• A rare incidence of a ship putting by, that is, intentionally grounding in order to avoid a collision, has been considered by the Court of Appeal in London.

The Bow Spring was proceeding north through the Suez Canal when it observed the dredger Manzanillo II on the starboard bow, apparently shaping to cross the channel.Unfortunately, Manzanillo II was not readily identifiable as a dredger and indeed, up until a short time before reaching the channel, did not turn to commence actual dredging operations. Each ship attempted to contact the other by VHF to determine the other's intentions but without success.The Master of Bow Spring decided that it was necessary to come full astern and turn starboard thereby intentionally grounding the vessel. At the Court of First Instance it was held that the actions of the Bow Spring were hurried and an illconsidered over-reaction.However, Manzanillo II was also considered at fault as she ought to have been aware that ships using the channel might be concerned that dredgers approaching from the starboard side might be thought to be entering the channel. Blame was attached 50% to each ship.

The matter was appealed by Manzanillo II, arguing that she should have been held free from blame.The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the Court of First Instance and emphasised that although Manzanillo II was displaying restricted manoeuvrability shapes there was no other indication that she was a dredger and that her slight alterations of course to port whilst approaching the channel were inadequate and incapable of indicating to Bow Spring that her intention was to turn away from the channel and not to cross it. Manzanillo II should, by a greater and more obvious manoeuvre to port, have made it clear to Bow Spring well before she did, that she was not going to cross the channel. The risk that Manzanillo II was not actually crossing the channel was one that the Master was not prepared to take because of the danger of collision and the Court of Appeal's affirmation of the 50/50 apportionment to blame indicates the partial sympathy with the Master's assessment.

A plague of locusts on your radar

Seafarers will be familiar with large concentrations of fishing boats off the west coast of Africa which fill their radar screens, but these pictures testify to an image of more biblical proportions, namely a vast swarm of locusts off the port of Nouakchott. The size of the swarm was 14nm by 7nm, an area of approximately 186 square km, resulting in spectacular radar images and a new deck coating.

Notice of Arrival to the US Coast Guard

Timely submission of an accurate Notice of Arrival (NOA) is of paramount importance when en route to any US destination; failure to comply with the NOA procedures can lead to significant delays to the ship.

It is now apparent that the US Coast Guard (USCG) considers any changes in a ship's circumstances as invalidating any NOA already submitted, requiring the submission of revised information to the USCG and possible delay to the ship.

A recent example of this problem arose when two stowaways were discovered by the crew on board a ship on arrival at Houston.The ship had previously given the requisite 96 hour NOA to the USCG. The USCG took the view that the change of circumstances - the presence of the two stowaways on board - invalidated the NOA, necessitating the submission of revised information and requiring the ship to wait outside Houston - potentially - for a further 96 hours. In the event, after negotiations, the US authorities agreed to reduce this 'delay' to 24 hours.

The Association has received a number of notifications from Members of the failure of the USCG to accept NOAs since November last year. In addition to the above, examples include; an omission to provide the 24-hour telephone number of the ship's port agent, an omission to provide the correct prefix number for the ship's satellite telephone and also the failure to amend NOAs for the second, and subsequent, US ports of call. Whilst these errors may seem minor, they can lead to significant delays to the ship.

Should circumstances on board change or errors or omissions be noted in a NOA after submission, then revised information should be sent to the USCG in a timely manner in accordance with the regulations. If 96 hours or more remain in the voyage, then changes must be submitted as soon as practical but at least 24 hours before entering the port or place of destination. If less than 24 hours of the voyage remain, then the changes must be submitted as soon as practical but at least 12 hours before arrival in port.

Lawyers advise that there is no requirement to re-submit the whole NOA, rather the amended information should be included in the relevant section of the NOA form and be submitted, making reference to the time of filing the original NOA.

Tanker overfill alarm failure

• A recent MARS (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme) article published by the Nautical Institute highlighted a potentially very serious problem experienced by one tanker operator which we wish to bring to the attention of all tanker operating Members and their sea staff.

The tanker in question was loading a clean product with a light density of only 0.665. During the loading operation tanks were filled in excess of 95% during which it was found that the automatic high overfill alarms did not activate.

Pre-arrival tests had been successfully conducted on this equipment. A thorough investigation ensued in cooperation with the equipment manufacturers. This resulted in the revelation that the float devices manufactured from stainless steel did not provide sufficient buoyancy to operate effectively in cargoes with density less than 0.750.

In this particular instance the manufacturers accepted the responsibility for replacement of all the flotation devices on this ship.

For those operators likely to carry lighter density products and/or chemicals we strongly recommend that their technical departments and sea staff review the nature of the equipment fitted on board their particular ships, if necessary in conjunction with the manufacturers, in order to assure themselves that a similar problem could not happen on board their ships.