Volume 13: Number 1: January 2006
NAVIGATION AND SEAMANSHIP
AIS Text messaging facility contributes to causes of a collision
A recent report highlights the dangers of two ships communicating via AIS free text facility.
The formal report of the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) into the collision between Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope in the East China Sea has recently been published and has highlighted the dangers of two ships communicating via the Automatic Identification System (AIS) text messaging facility, those dangers being very similar to the well known concept of the ‘VHF assisted collision’.
As the two ships approached in good visibility, the officer of the watch on board Sky Hope incorrectly assessed the encounter as one where Hyundai Dominion was overtaking his ship. Action by either ship was then delayed by discussions on the VHF. Further delay resulted when the officer on watch on Hyundai Dominion requested the other ship to keep clear using the text message facility on the AIS.
In spite of very late avoiding action taken by both ships, they collided. The starboard bridge wing, lifeboat davit and a container on Sky Hope were damaged. Fortunately, there were no injuries.
The MAIB report contains criticisms and recommendations for the owners and managers of the ships, many of which would be familiar to navigators.
What is new however, is the warning of the dangers of using the text facilities of AIS to send messages between ships in matters requiring prompt attention and action on the part of the receiving ship.
The full report is available on www.maib.gov.uk.
Should a ship underway bear 100 per cent of the blame when colliding with an anchored ship?
Navigators might be interested to know how the English courts have assessed the respective responsibilities of the ships.
Collisions whereby a ship underway has made contact with a ship at anchor are surprisingly familiar to the Association. The English courts have recently assessed the respective responsibilities in just such a circumstance.
On 2 August 2000 the Global Mariner and the Atlantic Crusader came into collision in the River Orinoco off the port of Matanzas, Venezuela, as a result of which Global Mariner sank.
The collision occurred in the course of Global Mariner leaving her berth and turning180° to starboard to commence her downriver passage, (tugs and a local pilot were in attendance). Another ship, Illapel, was anchored abeam of Global Mariner, some 2.5-3 cables distance. Atlantic Crusader was at anchor about a half-mile downstream of Global Mariner. There was a significant current setting downriver some 4-5 knots. The current caused Atlantic Crusader to yaw substantially, to about 35-40° either side of her mean upriver heading.
Global Mariner contended that Atlantic Crusader was solely to blame because Atlantic Crusader had been anchored in an unsafe anchorage and had failed to take any or adequate steps to control her yaw and sway.
Atlantic Crusader argued that Global Mariner was solely to blame for the collision as Atlantic Crusader had always been visible; her yawing was not unusual for a ship at anchor in a river with a fast flowing current, and her anchorage was not unsafe.
The court found that although Atlantic Crusader’s anchorage position was not unsafe, Atlantic Crusader was at fault in failing to control her yaw and sway. The court was persuaded by experts that the Master could have and should have anchored using an open moor, i.e. with both anchors, and was negligent in utilizing a single anchor. Further, the court accepted that it was possible for her crew to utilize the rudder whilst anchored to minimize the yaw and that they had negligently failed to do this.
However, the court also found, with the assistance of expert evidence, that there was sufficient sea room for Global Mariner, if she had been maneuvered differently, to have passed Atlantic Crusader safely, even at the extremity of Atlantic Crusader’s yaw and that the failure of Atlantic Crusader to control yaw and sway was not causative of the collision. The court found the Global Mariner solely to blame and the question of apportionment therefore did not arise.
Within the judgement certain interesting conclusions were reached; that an open moor was a recognized technique, requiring no more than ordinary good seamanship and that the use of helm was an obvious step to take. Atlantic Crusader was at fault in not anchoring or re-anchoring in this manner.
The starting point for assessment was the framework contained in Rules 5 and 7 of the Collision Regulations, 1972 i.e. the ‘Look Out’ rule and the ‘Risk of Collision’ rule. Those on board Global Mariner proceeded on the basis that both Illapel and Atlantic Crusader posed no risk to their proposed manoeuvre, i.e. failed to form an accurate appraisal of the positions of Illapel and Atlantic Crusader and failed to observe Atlantic Crusader’s yawing and to plan their passage accordingly. There was a comprehensive failure in the execution of the turn. Global Mariner proceeded too far to the North, came too close to Illapel, came too far downstream and came out of the turn too quickly. All of these matters flowed both from the prior failure of appreciation and lookout and from the unusual decision to use the engines, for a sustained period in breach of Rule 6 (Safe Speed). Among the factors to take into account in determining what is a ‘safe speed’ are traffic density and the state of the current (Rule 6(a)(v)).
The court declined to criticize those on Global Mariner for their conduct from the time they first became concerned as to the proximity of Atlantic Crusader two or three minutes before the collision because by then, a collision was in any event probable, so that such conduct made no causative difference.
The issue to be resolved was: would the collision have occurred even if Atlantic Crusader had controlled her yaw? If the answer is ‘yes’, then Atlantic Crusader’s fault is causatively irrelevant and Global Mariner must be solely to blame for the collision. If the answer is ‘no’, then there is a need to consider apportionment.
The court reiterated that though there is much to criticize in the conduct of those on Atlantic Crusader, her failure to control yaw and sway was not causative of the collision.
Usefully the court went on to advise that had it thought Atlantic Crusader’s fault (in not controlling yaw and sway) to be causative, it would nonetheless have remained of the view that the preponderance of blame lay with Global Mariner. Whatever the assumed failings on board Atlantic Crusader, the faults of those on Global Mariner played the major role in converting a passing with the potential for embarrassment into a collision. The court would have apportioned liability 90 per cent to Global Mariner and 10 per cent to Atlantic Crusader; necessarily, however, this observation is of academic interest only.
Navigators should be aware of their duty to control sway and yaw on fast flowing rivers and during tidal flows. A slightly different assessment by the expert witnesses as to available sea room might have resulted in Atlantic Crusader attracting a significant minority of blame.
Reference: (2005) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
Passage planning - why not leave way points to port?
The October 2005 edition of the Nautical Institute magazine (Seaways) included an article in the ‘MARS’ section (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme) wherein the editor, Captain R Beedel FNI, has made what appears to be an eminently sensible suggestion concerning passage planning between way points.
There has been a growing recognition of the apparent increase in collisions and ‘near misses’ involving ships in ‘end on’ and ‘overtaking’ situations, particularly when pursuing coastal ‘point to point’way point navigation, negotiating routing schemes and in areas of restricted waters.
The almost universal use and reliance upon GPS, computer software to generate optimal tracks, electronic charts and the improved performance of radar systems have all contributed to a greater degree of navigational accuracy and ‘track-keeping’.
An unfortunate effect of this overall improvement in navigational accuracy has been the greater concentration of ships all endeavouring to be on the same track or its reciprocal in certain areas.
Captain Beedel points to aviation navigational practice which has apparently established a common rule or code of conduct in which aircraft leave all recognised way points to port. He has suggested that marine navigation could also benefit from adopting a similar code of conduct.
Obviously the degree of offset to port of the ship would be dependent upon the amount of sea room available, ranging from a few cables to a mile or two in more open waters.
The advantages of pursuing such a policy would include more room for manoeuvre and the potential reduction of close quarters’ situations and potential near miss scenarios currently being created by common way point navigation techniques. We suggest that ship navigators give this suggestion due consideration when undertaking their passage planning of voyages.
Reference: Seaways Magazine October 2005
Safe and secure mooring arrangements
The Association is aware that it has become a common practice for mooring lines to be left turned up on warping drums.
Apart from the self evident hazards to crew, this practice does not safely secure the ship as warping drum sizes ensure that only a few turns of rope can be deployed and the mooring lines can easily render (slip) under load and fall slack.
This problem occurred in a recent incident handled by the Association where, as a consequence, the ship’s bow broke loose from a mooring buoy and struck a pier upon which an expensive tourist aquarium was being constructed.
In addition, the small barrel diameter of warping drums can cause heat damage, partially melt and weaken synthetic ropes and finally require premature replacement of expensive ropes. We suggest that Members should specifically ban this particular practice and remind their ships of the need for the following;
- Sufficient moorings always to be deployed.
- Constant and equal tension in all moorings to be maintained.
- Moorings to be properly secured at all times, either on drums specifically designed for this purpose or on the bitts.
- Moorings to be adequately monitored and adjusted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the ship remains safely secure at all times.
CONTAINERS AND CARGOES
Specialised testing determines the effect of open drain plugs on reefer containers
The Association has received several claims for alleged damage to frozen seafood as a result of leaving floor drains open.
Refrigerated containers are usually fitted with floor drain holes which are located in each corner of the container. In ‘chill mode’ the function of the drain holes is to prevent water collecting in the floor and blocking the air passage. Drain holes would normally be closed off with a rubber bung when the container is operated in ‘frozen mode’.
Drain holes are normally only opened in chill mode when high levels of ventilation are required (e.g. the carriage of flower bulbs) because water has been known to build up and not only block the airways but cause damage to the cargo. The source of the water can be condensation or water carry over from the evaporator.
External ambient air entering the container whilst operating in frozen mode is not usually beneficial. This air is likely to be warmer and contain moisture. The warmer air may directly affect the cargo’s temperature at the point where it enters the container and may alter the air circulation around the container. Further, moisture entering the container may circulate around the container and condense onto the unit’s evaporator coil (being the coldest part inside the container). This can be seen by the increase in defrost water during the defrost cycles. In extreme cases the evaporator coil becomes completely blocked with ice stopping the air flow and creating much longer defrost cycles. Some of the moisture may also condense onto other cold surfaces, such as the cargo packaging, the container wall and the container’s ‘T’ bar floor channels. This may also cause ice to build up, leading to disruption in the air circulation around the container.
The Association has received several claims for alleged damage to frozen seafood as a result of leaving these floor drains open. Specialist reefer consultants Messrs. Cambridge Refrigeration Technology (CRT) were asked to design and undertake tests to determine the effect on cargo of leaving the drain holes open.
A container was placed in one of CRT’s environmental test chambers which completely envelops the whole container within a controlled, monitored environment and relative humidity set to 60%. The container floor contained standard pallets with a blanket of wood on them to simulate how cargo would affect the airflow across the floor of the container. A number of frozen prawn cartons were placed near the drain holes and temperature sensors placed inside the cartons to monitor the cargo temperature. The airflow and air temperature were recorded on both sides of the drain holes to measure the effect of any airflow through them on the temperature of the cargo. In addition the defrost water temperature was measured after each cycle, to determine the effect of any moisture passing through the drain holes into the container. Sixty thermo-couples measured temperature at various places within the container and the test chamber.
The temperature distribution results show that there was no significant temperature alteration or fluctuation inside the container as a result of the drain holes being left open or closed during operation in frozen mode. Ice build-up in the mesh at the base of the drain holes blocks any potential airflow flowing through them during frozen mode. This ice builds-up from condensation from the external ambient air. This ‘sealing effect’ may also hold true for any minor cracks in the container or damaged door seals.
Measured defrost water also shows that there is no additional moisture entering the container through the drain holes, during frozen mode operation.
In summary, the results showed that leaving the drain holes open during frozen mode operation makes no significant difference to cargo temperature distribution, as the holes freeze up with ice. Notwithstanding this, it is still good practice to seal the drain plugs with rubber bungs during ‘frozen mode’ operation, if an automatic system is not fitted.
Many thanks to Cambridge Refrigeration Technology who are recognised leaders in their field.
Cambridge Refrigeration Technology: www.crtech.co.uk.
Mis-declaration of cargo by shippers is becoming more common
The Association has recently had experience of cargo being offered for shipment described as Thiourea D. Shippers are aware that Thiourea Dioxide will often be refused carriage or if carried would demand higher freight.
It appears that the amended name and slightly different chemical compositions provided by the shippers are an attempt to deceive shipowners. The consequences of these deceptions go beyond mere freight. The subject incident caused significant delay to the ship when the cargo reacted (because of the mis-declaration it was not being carried in accordance with IMDG 4.2), violently, issuing toxic sulphur dioxide gas that contaminated other cargoes and was a potential danger to the crew.
Access hatches - a not so obvious danger
During the course of the year the Managers have been notified of three accidents involving dockworkers falling through or tripping over open access hatches to lashing bridges on container ships.
In one case the dockworker concerned sustained a serious injury, resulting in the loss of an eye.
The common feature of all three accidents is that the victims had previously gained access to the lashing bridge via the access hatch, so were aware of its existence. Each of the hatches was fitted with a lid, or cover, which should have been closed after the victim negotiated the ladder to the lashing bridge. In the case referred to above, the dockworker inadvertently put his foot into the open hatch and fell, hitting his head on an adjacent turnbuckle. In another case the dockworker fell through the open hatch, injuring his chest and shoulder and in the third incident the dockworker stepped backwards into the open hatch, injuring his leg.
Whilst the accidents should not result in claims for compensation, primarily because they were caused by the carelessness of the individuals concerned, they nevertheless pose the question, could they have been avoided? The clear answer is yes. The next question is, what could be done to prevent similar accidents? It is apparent from two photographs that the access hatches are not readily apparent, particularly when the ambient lighting conditions are not good. The fact that hatchways are often painted the same colour as the walkway serves only to camouflage the existence of the hatchways. Warning notices should be displayed on the underside of the hatch lid or other prominent places, along the following lines ‘Warning - To prevent accidents, close hatch lid after accessing the bridge’.
Hatchways should be painted a contrasting colour or black and yellow hazard stripes painted around the edge of all openings. Hopefully then, if the careless stevedore or Crew member fails to close the hatch behind him he might at least be alerted to its presence after completing his task and returning along the lashing bridge.
REGULATORY UPDATE
Canadian Environmental Agency - given new powers
Masters should be aware that Canada has enacted controversial environmental legislation which, although affecting maritime affairs, has bypassed the Canadian Transport Department and has given significant powers to the Environmental Agency.The powers with respect to investigation and enforcement, including search, seizure or detention and arrest, extends to Environment Canada officials known as Game Officers. They are unlikely to have the same kind of training as Transport Canada officials and, practically speaking, this may result in difficulties when dealing with Masters or other ship personnel. The legislation, Bill C-15, which amends the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, came into force in Canada on 28 June 2005. The Bill was championed by environmental lobbies which thought that the Transport Department was not being aggressive enough in tracking down polluters. Accordingly, it might be expected that Environment Canada and the Game Officers will be proactive in Canadian waters and possibly also the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It is important to note that the new legislation appears to extend jurisdiction beyond territorial waters (the previous extent of jurisdiction for Transport Canada under the previous law). The new provisions appear to allow foreign ships to be detained where spillage occurs in Canada’s EEZ.
The Act greatly increases the existing penalties; the new penalty provisions provide for a maximum fine of C$1 million or up to three years imprisonment, or both, where a conviction is obtained on indictment. Further, the new penalty provisions extend to the ship’s owner, operator, as well as Master and Chief Engineer.
The legislation transforms some offences into strict liability offences such that the Environmental Agency may not be required to prove any intent on the part of the ship’s officers to commit the offence. The legislation also provides protection for ‘whistle blowers’.
It is presumed that as the Environmental Agency has succeeded in obtaining these powers there will, at some stage, be considerably increased activity on their part.
IMO - clarification concerning the retention of records/documents on board ships for port state control inspection purposes.
In recognising that ships operate in multiple jurisdictions, a recent IMO circular highlights that the originals of records/documents/ certificates on board are the primary means of evidence for demonstrating compliance with regulations.
Therefore, such documents should be retained on board at all times unless a Port or Coastal State Authority can provide an adequate explanation and legal basis for their removal. Such removals should only proceed with the agreement of the Master and all parties concerned.
When originals are removed from the ship they should be replaced by certified copies and receipts for the originals retained on board stating the reasons for their removal.
A related question arises as to whether the Oil Record Book should be retained by the seller of a ship or should stay with the ship. The UK Marine and Coastguard Agency has recently advised that the original should stay on board for three years irrespective of the ship’s sale. There appears to be some difference in approach between jurisdictions but as liabilities will remain with the seller it is important that the seller retains at least certified copies.
IMO Reference: MSC - MEPC. 4/Circular 1
California introduces new wastewater regulations
The California Clean Coast Act relates to on board incineration and waste water release standards for ocean-going ships calling at State ports.
The law, which will prohibit all ships from conducting on board incineration within three miles of the California coast, comes into effect on 1 January 2006.
The new law also has provisions relating to the release of greywater, sewage sludge, oily bilgewater, hazardous waste and other waste. All ships will be prohibited from discharging such material into the State's waters and marine sanctuaries. If there is a release of such material from an ocean-going ship the owner must notify the State Water Resources Control Board within 24 hours. The Board requires a detailed report, including the time, date, and place of release, as well as information on actions taken to avoid future discharges.
The first time an ocean-going ship sails from a California port in 2006, the ship must provide detailed information to the State Lands Commission, including its ability to store greywater. This information must also be kept on board the ship at all times. Violations of the Act can lead to a fine of up to US$25,000 per incident.
Reference: www.leginfo.ca.gov
www.usc.edu/org/seagrant/AmendedCCA1.pdf
SAFETY
Cargo alert - a new danger from carrying coconut oil and other vegetable oils is becoming apparent.
We wish to highlight two incidents which have come to our attention which indicate unforeseen hazardous conditions that may arise when discharging coconut oil and other vegetable oils.
The first incident was reported in the Nautical Institute’s Seaways magazine within the Institute’s MARS Section (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme).
The ship was carrying a full cargo of crude coconut oil for discharge at two European ports. None of the tanks were fully discharged until arrival at the second port. The normal discharge process for vegetable oils requires the ‘squeezing’ of cargo to minimise the residual cargo remaining on board. This operation requires personnel to enter the cargo tank during the final tank stripping process; in this case the Master and two crew members.
Throughout the discharge the high velocity PV valves were open in free flow mode (vacuum side kept open) and 6 to 7 hours before anticipated tank entry the cargo tank hatch was opened and the inert gas blower was started and run on the fresh air mode. During this process however the inert gas blower was also providing air flow to all the ship’s cargo tanks, thus the volume and flow rate to the tank to be entered was greatly reduced.
All normal required checks and procedures were made prior to the issue of a tank entry permit. This included the stationing of breathing apparatus and crew members on standby in the locality on deck. Checks of oxygen content as well as LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) were also carried out, which revealed that the oxygen level was 20.9% and the LEL was 0%.
The Master was equipped with a portable radio as well as a combined oxygen and LEL personal gas detector and the ships’ Chief Officer and pumpman were standing by on deck.
Once the Master and the accompanying two crewmembers reached the tank bottom they realised that it was becoming difficult to breath and immediately commenced evacuating the tank. Fortunately they managed to reach the upper platform about three metres inside the tank and there, thanks to the prompt action of the standby crew on deck, were immediately evacuated and hospitalised.
During the subsequent terminal and ship investigations the question was posed as to whether the carbon monoxide content of the tank had been checked. This had not been done but was immediately investigated. It was found that the carbon monoxide content in all the tanks was in excess of 3,000 ppm.
In the second incident the circumstances are similar and the following information is drawn, with kind permission, from the UK MCA (Maritime & Coastguard Agency).
Regretfully this incident resulted in a fatality and after investigation the UK MCA issued their Marine Guidance Note - MGN 223(M) - Carriage of Coconut Oil & Other Vegetable Oils as Cargo in Tanks, in July 2002, drawing attention to the hazard and making recommendations to ensure safe working practices when handling such cargoes.
The incident occurred on board a ship discharging a cargo of Indonesian crude coconut oil in a north european port.
A shore squad of six men were hired to enter a tank nearing cargo discharge completion in order to sweep the residue towards the pump suction. Within minutes the workmen appeared to be in difficulties. Four men were able to leave the tank but the remaining two collapsed over the tank heating coils. Both men suffered serious burns from the heating coils and regretfully one of them subsequently died.
The tank atmosphere was tested immediately after the accident for oxygen deficiency and flammability and found it to be safe from those hazards. However large concentrations of carbon monoxide were measured in excess of 1,000 ppm, although there was no clear explanation at the time for the presence of carbon monoxide.
One likely explanation put forward in the Marine Guidance Note is that the temperature of the heating coils had reached levels high enough to generate carbon monoxide from the reducing quantity of cargo in the tank during the discharge process.
As a consequence of this particular incident the UK MCA recommended as follows:
- Before spaces are entered, the full range of precautions for entering into enclosed spaces, described in the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen (Section 17) or the International Maritime Organisation Assembly Resolution A. 864(20) entitled ‘Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ship’ are observed.
- The atmosphere of cargo spaces with vegetable oils should be continuously monitored during discharge for the presence of carbon monoxide if it is essential for personnel to enter within that space as part of the discharge operations.
- The temperature of the cargo should be monitored closely throughout the discharge, particularly during the closing stages of the cargo discharge operation.
MGN 223 (M) also gives advice regarding the properties of carbon monoxide which is toxic by inhalation and can cause serious damage to health by prolonged exposure. High concentrations can swiftly prove fatal. The eight hour exposure limit for personnel to carbon monoxide concentrations is 30 ppm, though for short term exposure not exceeding 15 minutes duration concentrations of up to 200 ppm can be allowed. Obviously any monitoring equipment utilised on board should be capable of achieving the above degrees of accuracy to be effective.
The Association is aware that a number of Members operate ships in the carriage of these products and we wish to highlight the threat of carbon monoxide generation during cargo operations. We wish to stress the need to recognise this hazard during cargo operations’ planning and the adoption of effective safety measures for tank entry and cargo operations.
We recommend that the MCA Marine Guidance Note MGN 223(M) is consulted and that all Members and shipboard staff involved in carriage of these cargoes review their Safety Management System to ensure that the mounting evidence for the potentially hazardous generation of carbon monoxide is fully taken into account. We are concerned that whilst this specific hazard appears to be known by shore installations it does not appear to be as well known on board ships involved in this particular trade.
The Association wishes to thank both the Nautical Institute and the UK MCA for the substantial use of their information and guidance in bringing this hazard to the attention of the Members and ship’s complements.
Reference: MCA www.mcga.gov.uk
Seaways Magazine October 2005
SAFETY
Ignition of methanol fumes
The Association has recently assisted a Member in dealing with a small explosion within a cargo tank containing methanol.
The cause of the explosion is attributed to the overheating of the packing gland at the deck penetration of the drive shaft for the deep well pump used to discharge cargo from the tank. Fortunately the subsequent fire in the tank was controlled promptly by the crew and no injury or structural damage resulted.
It is notable that this equipment had been overhauled only a couple of weeks before, during a routine dry-docking. The pump in question had been tested using water but there was no record of any overheating. The packing gland in question was in an inaccessible part of the tank being located just below the main deck.
Members may wish to consider thorough checks of such glands and bearings where no remote sensor has been installed to monitor overheating, particularly after deep well pumps have been subject to overhauls and repairs. Further details can be obtained from the Managers.
MISCELLANEOUS
Recent publications
New Ship-to-Ship Transfer Guide The International Chamber of Shipping and the Oil Companies’ International Marine Forum (OCIMF) have launched a new, fourth, edition of their Ship-to-Ship Transfer Guide (Petroleum). The Guide represents the latest industry standard for the management and control of these complex but increasingly routine procedures. The Guide is published by Witherby & Company and costs £50 (plus postage and packing).www.witherbys.com
Reducing the risk of Port State Control Detentions Lloyd’s Register has published a laminated pocket checklist to help shipowners and their crews comply with International Regulations. The checklist identifies the most common causes of ship detention. It is designed to supplement owners’ operational procedures and will help to ensure compliance during routine PSC inspections and should be used in conjunction with Maintenance Guide Checklist, also produced by Lloyd’s Register. Both publications can be ordered through Lloyd’s Register website, www.lr.org
A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book - Part 1 (machinery space operation) This guide is designed to address the increasing problems of ships being detained and fined (particularly in the USA) due to equipment malfunction, and also to aid management of oily water separators in the engine room. The guide contains instructions and interpretations on how properly to record all related operations as per MARPOL 73/78 Annex I, Regulation 20. Price US$50 (for Intertanko members) US$100 (for non-members).
A Guide to Bunkering of Ships for the Purposes of Annex VI to MARPOL With the recent entering into force of Annex VI to MARPOL (air pollution), amendments to normal bunkering routines are needed in order to ensure compliance. This guide highlights operational amendments which may be needed to satisfy the objectives of the Regulations. Price US$60 (for Intertanko members), US$120 (for non-members). Intertanko Oslo office Fax: +47 22 12 26 41, email: publications@intertanko.com
In Brief
Immersion suits ‘Professional Mariner’ has an article reminding shipowners that as of 1 June 2006 all cargo and bulk carriers over 500 gross tons will have to carry sufficient immersion suits for every person on board. Professional Mariner/September 2006. www.professionalmariner.com
Ballast exchange in Amazon ports ‘Intertanko Weekly News’ warns of regional variations to the standard ballast exchange requirement of newly enacted (15 October 2005) ballast water legislation (equivalent of the prospective IMO Ballast Water Convention) Extra ballast exchanges may be needed to reduce salinity when entering the Amazon Basin. Intertanko Weekly News 46/2005
Editor’s message
Members may have noticed that this edition of Risk Watch has a different format and, more importantly, a wider range of topical issues than in previous editions along with more extensive referencing of source material. The editors are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within Risk Watch and would appreciate any feedback from readers as to how the publication might be improved. We hope you consider the new format an improvement. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk
 Volume 13: Number 1: January 2006 |