Volume 14: Number 2: April 2007

NAVIGATION AND SEAMANSHIP

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The Association has recently investigated a collision and found that theWatch Officer was too reliant on the satellite navigation system.

The subject vessel anchored mid-stream in order to work cargo.The Watch Officer fixed the position by GPS immediately upon anchoring and set the GPS alarm for two cables.The tide then changed and it was observed that another vessel, also anchored and working cargo mid-stream, was approaching. The Watch Officer checked the GPS and believed that his vessel was not dragging her anchor. Local VTS then contacted the vessel and advised them that they were, in fact, dragging anchor. Again, the Watch Officer checked the position of the vessel just by reference to GPS and satisfied himself, incorrectly again, that the vessel was not dragging anchor.

It was a significant time later,when the local VTS insisted that a pilot board in order to rectify the situation, that the Watch Officer and also the Master realised that they were in fact dragging anchor.

It is unclear why the GPS alarm did not sound. It may be that the audible alarm was not switched on. Alternatively, it may have been that the initial GPS fix was made at an inappropriate time. In any event it is clear that the Watch Officer, and possibly the Master, made no attempt to fix the vessel's position using any means other than the GPS. Additionally it appears that the GPS position was not plotted on the chart at regular intervals. STCW 95 states that when circumstances permit, positions are to be checked at sufficiently frequent intervals by taking bearings of fixed navigational marks and readily identifiable shore objects. STCW does not refer to the use of GPS fixes. Other standard publications on navigation refer to the use of radar ring markers on conspicuous landmarks.

It may by that the reliance on GPS devices is increasingly tempting when Watch Officers undertake or are given other duties whilst on anchor watch. Good seamanship should incline Watch Officers to engage in proper position fixing and checking by more than one means whilst at anchor.

Gibraltar collision - was it a crossing situation? Was it restricted visibility?

A recently reported judgement in a collision case offers insight into the operation of the collision regulations with respect to restricted visibility and crossing situations when vessels are manoeuvring in the vicinity of pilot stations.

The collision was between the capesize bulk carrier BULK ATALANTA (BA) and the panamax bulk carrier FOREST PIONEER (FP). BA was inbound to Gibraltar and FP was outbound; both ships were in ballast. The collision occurred at 05:27 while it was still dark. There was a strong south westerly wind and intermittent heavy rain showers.

At 04:52 BA reduced speed to half ahead (9 knots). At about 05:10 she was brought around slowly to starboard into Gibraltar Bay towards the pilot station. At 05:12 her speed was further reduced to slow ahead (6 knots) which was 14 minutes before the collision (C-14). Shortly thereafter (C-12) the pilot boat was seen approaching on the starboard bow. BA continued to come slowly to starboard onto a heading of about 315° to afford a lee to the strong south westerly winds. Engine speed was further reduced to dead slow ahead (5 knots). At 05:20 (C-7), the Master noticed a red light of another vessel 5° or 10° off the port bow at a range of about 1 mile. (The Master thought that this was FP but the observation had to be inaccurate as FP was on the starboard bow of BA throughout). The Master contacted Gibraltar Port Control requesting that contact be made with the other vessel advising her 'to keep clear of my vessel as I was picking up a pilot'. Gibraltar Port Control apparently sought to do as requested. By now (C-6) the pilot boat was alongside and the engines of BA were stopped. Shortly afterwards the red side light of FP was seen fine on the starboard bow at a range of 3 or 4 cables. The Master was under the impression that she had 'drifted across' BA's bow.He ordered dead slow ahead and hard-astarboard. As soon as the pilot boarded he ordered full astern.

FP had been lying at anchor about 5 ½ cables west of the northern end of the South Mole of Gibraltar harbour. The VLCC MILLENNIUM MAERSK was at anchor about 5 cables south west of her. There were also 2 vessels south east of her, close to the South Mole. Having weighed her anchor FP's heading was 165°. Port Control gave permission for FP to leave port but warned of a vessel inbound manoeuvring to pick up a pilot.(this was BA).

The engines were put slow ahead at 05:13 (C-14). The Master's plan was to proceed to the south, passing to leeward of the VLCC. However, as she proceeded on a south easterly heading, the Master became concerned that as a result of leeway in the strong wind, the vessel was being carried too close to the ships anchored off the South Mole. Accordingly at 05:15 (C-12) the engines of FP were put half ahead and her helm put to starboard to bring her around to 210°.

Shortly thereafter at 05:18 (C-9), having steadied on 210°, the echo of BA was noted at a range of 1.7 miles, bearing 175°. The ARPA gave BA's course and speed as 320° and 7 knots respectively.Vectors demonstrated that the vessels were on collision courses.

In the rain no lights of BA could be identified. The Master of FP, however, made the assumption that BA would turn to starboard onto a northerly heading in order to meet with the pilot. BA continued on her north westerly heading. FP sounded a warning signal of rapid blasts which were not heard on BA. Having appreciated the risk of collision with BA, the Master ordered dead slow ahead and starboard helm but very shortly thereafter (C-5) ordered hard to port because he was concerned that by turning he risked a collision with the anchored VLCC. The Master then ordered hard to starboard again having heard a 'hard starboard' order on the VHF and assuming it came from BA. BA came into view on the port bow at a range of about a ship's length.

The track of the two vessels could be reconstructed with some accuracy from the course recorder traces and the engine movement printouts from both vessels.The general picture of BA's track was clear enough. As from 05:12 (C-15) she was on a heading of about 315° with her head canting to port up to the line of the collision when she was on a heading of 2940 as from C-4. Throughout the relevant period she was slowly reducing speed from half ahead (9 knots).

As regards FP, her heading came around slowly from 165° at C-15 to 210° at C-9. Thereafter, subject to small changes of heading to starboard and port, the vessel's head finally came round to starboard to 219° at C-3 and to 280° at the time of the collision.

The collision occurred between the starboard bow of BA and the portside mid-ships of FP at an angle of about 15° leading forward. BA suffered substantial damage whilst FP suffered minor damage.

The apportionment of blame
The parties disagreed whether the collision occurred in restricted visibility and whether Rule 19 applied.The court, whilst accepting that visibility was reduced by rain squalls, decided it was not a restricted visibility case. They were not persuaded that the failure of each vessel to see the other until very close was attributable to poor visibility, rather, they attributed this failure to poor lookout. Although visibility was restricted intermittently, the court found that it was not appropriate that the Rule 19 regime should apply intermittently. However, the court did say that the varying states of visibility was a factor which was relevant to the dictates of good seamanship. In coming to this decision the court noted that the Met Office report said that it was raining with visibility of 9km. The Master of FP stated that it was only at 05:18 (C-9) that it had began to rain; the BA interest had argued that 'visibility was good but restricted by occasional rain squalls.'

BA argued that FP should have come out into the Gibraltar Bay on a more westerly course taking her to the north of the anchored VLCC and that FP's broadly southerly course towards the pilot station was unsatisfactory - the more so when FP knew that there was an inbound vessel due to pick up a pilot. The court considered that it was appropriate for FP to come away to the south from the anchorage position so long as a sharp look out was maintained for inward bound vessels.

BA argued that FP's alteration to 210° and increase in speed (at about C-12) was negligent.The court agreed and commented that even if it was desirable for FP to give greater sea room to the anchored vessels, an alteration of say 15° onto 180° would have been sufficient and safe with the result that FP and BA would pass at about half a mile starboard to starboard (and FP's engines should have been maintained at dead slow or slow ahead). The lights of BA were said not to have been visible at this time. However, FP was aware of BA's imminent arrival and her intention to pick up a pilot. There is no reason whatsoever why a proper radar lookout (all the more necessary if visibility was restricted by rain) should not have identified her echo prior to this manoeuvre. The effect of the alteration to 210° was to put BA some 30° to 35° on the port bow of FP. Almost immediately thereafter, the echo of BA was identified at a range of 1.7 miles bearing 175°. The ARPA vectors duly revealed that the vessels were on collision courses.

FP argued that from this time onwards the vessels were crossing with risk of collision; BA was the give way vessel and ought to have come to starboard.The court rejected this argument stating that the alteration to 210° was made without any awareness of BA. The consequence was to place the vessels on collision courses.

The case of TOJO MARU [1968] Lloyds Rep, makes it clear that no vessel is entitled, in the face of another vessel seen to be approaching, to put herself deliberately on a crossing course as stand-on vessel so as to force the other vessel to keep out of the way. However, in the present case FP had not actually seen BA. The court decided that FP could not argue her own poor lookout in circumstances where the effect of her alteration was to create a risk of collision,which did not exist before, and then claim the status of the stand-on vessel. It was recognised that the manoeuvre was not deliberate in the sense of being performed for the very purpose of establishing a crossing situation.Nevertheless it was deliberate in the sense of not being necessitated, for example, by the proximity of shallows.

It was, or should have been apparent, to FP that BA was manoeuvring to pick up a pilot. BA was accordingly constrained both in terms of course and speed; reducing speed and maintaining a lee for the pilot to board required a course of 320°. This was exactly the same course that FP's pilot had asked FP to maintain when FP arrived the previous day.

BA's main argument was that, as a matter of good seamanship, a vessel should take timely action to keep clear of another which was performing the operation of picking up a pilot.

The court decided that FP's alteration of course to 210° and increase of speed to half ahead were unseamanlike and transformed a situation of comparative safety into one of imminent risk of collision. Despite being aware that the vessels were on collision courses, FP broadly maintained her south-westerly course. This was based on the assumption that BA would come to starboard. This assumption was unwarranted given the prevailing weather and the proximity of the pilot boat to the BA.

The helm action by FP first to starboard and then to port then to starboard again, apart from evidencing the sense of indecision and confusion on board FP,were of no great causative significance. FP should have taken vigorous steps to reduce headway. The appropriate action was to stop and put engines full astern.

As regards the fault in the conduct of BA, there is no reasonable explanation as to why the echo of FP was not identified from C-8 onwards. The lookout on board BA was inadequate. If BA had maintained a proper lookout she should have been expected to take off way more vigorously and possibly alter course to starboard. If she had done so the collision may have been avoided or at least the damage reduced. Her failure to do was causative of the collision.

The court gave judgement that FP must bear by far the greater proportion of blame. She created the situation of danger, putting the BA in a very unhappy predicament. A fair apportionment was judged to be 85/15 in favour of BA.

Exchange of information between master and pilot (MPX)

Members are reminded that a few years ago The International Group of P&I Associations, in conjunction with Intertanko, Bimco, International Maritime Pilots'Association, International Chamber of Shipping, ISMA and others,was involved in an Inter Industry Group under the aegis of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of IMO which considered the exchange of information between master and pilot.

The result was 2 forms, one from shore to ship and the other from ship to shore, to ensure that both the boarding pilot and the vessel's bridge team exchange basic information prior to the pilot boarding the vessel. The International Chamber of Shipping Bridge Procedures Guide (Third Edition, Part A, Section 2.6.2) suggests that information exchange be initiated by the ship approximately 24 hours before the pilot's ETA to allow sufficient time for detailed planning to take place both on the ship and ashore.

The purpose of the Ship to Shore form is to provide the pilot with practical information about the vessel, its status, performance, and its pertinent equipment; the Shore to Ship form provides the ship with information about the intended pilotage passage. The forms are not intended to diminish the obligations of the master and pilot to exchange information following the actual boarding of the pilot.

Members are recommended to use the forms and to report to the Association any cases where Pilotage Authorities fail to cooperate.

The forms can be found on the Britannia website:
www.britanniapandi.com/circulars/general_9.pdf

REGULATORY UPDATE

Bulk carrier surveys in Brazil

The Association's correspondent in Santos - Pandibra McLintock - has highlighted an often forgotten requirement for bulk carriers that are 18 or more years old visiting Brazilian ports. Since 16 December 2003, the Brazilian Naval Directorate for Ports and Coast (DPC) requires that all bulk carriers (including OBOs) that are 18 or more years old and which are calling at Brazilian ports to load solid bulk cargoes equal to or more than 1.78 tonnes per cubic metre must be surveyed prior to loading in order to confirm that the vessel is safe and seaworthy. Types of cargo that may have this sort of density include iron ore, bauxite,manganese and phosphate.

The DPC requires that all such surveys are performed while the vessel is totally free of cargo and also gas free. The survey must be carried out by a Classification Society employed by the vessel's owners, or their representatives, that is registered as an acceptable society by the local port captaincy or DPC. Membership of IACS does not automatically mean that the Classification Society will be acceptable to the Brazilian authorities. The Classification Society must not be the same as the one with which the vessel maintains its class. A surveyor employed by the DPC may also attend the survey. The Brazilian Coast Guard requires at least 10 days advance notice that a qualifying vessel intends to load cargo in Brazil so that survey arrangements can be made.

Generally speaking, it will be possible for the DPC survey to be carried out at anchorage. However, this depends upon the requirements of the local port captaincy at each port. If the survey is passed, a DPC Certificate will be issued allowing the vessel to load.

In order to avoid any delays in obtaining a DPC certificate it is recommended that Members contact their local agents well in advance whenever a qualifying bulk carrier intends to load bulk cargo in Brazil.

As the costs of arranging a survey and, in particular, the time that could be lost if delays occur are potentially significant, the Association recommends that charter parties for qualifying vessels that potentially will load cargoes in Brazil should always clearly specify which party will be responsible for the costs and time of arranging/obtaining the DPC Certificate.

Alert - are you using the new Oil Record Books?

Recent revisions to MARPOL Annex I include changes to the coding, procedures and information required to be recorded in Oil Record Books.

These revisions became effective on 1 January 2007. To meet these changed requirements, new editions of the Oil Record Book Parts 1 and 2 have now been published.

The new Oil Record Books Parts 1 and 2 must be used from 1 January 2007. However, if the new books are not yet available onboard,Masters and Chief Engineers can continue to fill in the old style Oil Record Book currently in use, as long as they use the new codes and requirements for all the entries.Once the new style Oil Record Books are received, any existing stocks of the old style books onboard must not be used.

Ship owners, ship managers,Masters and Chief Engineers must therefore ensure that they order copies of the new edition of the Oil Record Books Parts 1 and 2 for use onboard as soon as possible.

The new editions of the Oil Record Books have the following ISBN numbers:

Oil Record Book Part 1: ISBN 13 978 0 11 552 8217
Oil Record Book Part 2: ISBN 13 978 0 11 552 8224

For those using the Intertanko publication; 'A Guide for correct entries in the Oil Record Book (Part 1 - Machinery Space Operations)', please note that this will now require corrections to meet the new MARPOL requirements. Intertanko have advised that due to the current continuous debate within the IMO relating to Oil Record Book entries, they are planning revisions to this Guide, but have said that such revisions will not be published until the end of 2007 at the earliest.

Further information regarding the detail of the new requirements may be obtained from Intertanko www.intertanko.com or the UK MCA Marine Information Note MIN 273 (M)
www.mcga.gov.uk

US Coast Guard issues EPIRB advice

Fairplay's Solutions magazine has highlighted a reminder from the US Coast Guard that with effect from 1 January 2007 both 121.5MHz and 243MHz emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) are prohibited from use. The only permissible rescue beacon to have on board is a digital 406MHz model.

It appears that the USCG's action is in anticipation of the 1 February 2009 deadline when 121.5/243MHz distress signals will no longer be processed by satellite.

Solutions magazine goes on to state that the prohibition does not affect 121.5/243MHz man overboard devices because these are designed to work directly with a base alerting unit only and not with a satellite system. (Solutions Magazine: Issue 124: 11 January 2007)

SAFETY

Electrocution fatality

A recent report in the Nautical Institute Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS Report No 170/200659 - December 2006) discusses the circumstances surrounding the death of a junior engineer during investigation of an electrical fault on a ship's cargo crane.

The ship's electrician asked the engineer to enter a narrow area of the crane body - accessible via a small hatchway under the crane operator's seat - to check the power distribution board while the electrician himself remained in the cab of the crane to check the crane controls. The engineer was extremely hot and undid his overalls, in the pockets of which he carried uninsulated metal tools. As the cover of the distribution board had been removed, the engineer was very close to the high voltage sections of the board in a very confined space.

At some point during the operation, the engineer did not reply to the questions of the electrician,who then found the engineer collapsed on the floor of the confined space. Unable to rescue him alone, there was a crucial delay while the electrician had to descend from the crane to summon help from the crew on the deck below, having no other means of communication. Unfortunately, by the time the engineer was removed from the space and lowered to deck, it was too late for resuscitation and the engineer did not regain consciousness.

The MARS Report highlighted a number of factors that contributed to this accident:

• Lack of proper risk assessment and work plan which led to unsafe investigation of the faults in situ rather than in a controlled workshop environment;
• Inappropriate use of protective clothing;
• Hazardous carriage of uninsulated tools on the person;
• Inadequate communication between electrician, the bridge and the rest of the crew;
• No rescue equipment prepared at the site.

Further details can be found at:
www.nautinst.org/mars/mars06/200659.htm

Lifeboats - ship-supplied sling failed to prevent freefall release

One of the Association's Members recently suffered an unexpected release of a freefall lifeboat as a result of the failure of the slings utilised to retain the lifeboat in place during a drill.Thankfully the three crew members on board the lifeboat were all properly strapped in at the time and despite a considerable drop to the waterline, suffered only minor injuries.

The Master quite often utilised heavy-duty slings to retain the lifeboat in place whilst testing the release mechanism. Following the incident, an inspection of the wire revealed that a considerable proportion of the diameter had been cut through in way of the securing grip. It is unclear how this cut came about. (The possibility exists that thieves had attempted to cut the wire into manageable pieces but failed). However, in any event, it is clear that the slings utilised were not those supplied by the manufacturer of the lifeboat as they contained no manufacturer's mark or numbering. Further, it seems likely that original slings would have been made of cast steel, whereas the sling that failed was made of stainless steel.

All such slings should have a certificate showing that they are fit for purpose and that certificate should be retained on board. The slings should be subject to thorough visual inspection each time they are used.

Lifeboat safety initiative

Ship owner organisations, Intertanko and Intercargo, in conjunction with the International Life-Saving Appliance Manufacturers Association (ILAMA) have just launched a 'feedback forum' for users of lifeboats and other Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) equipment. The purpose of the forum is to channel the experiences of the actual users of such equipment - both officers and crews - to the manufacturers, so that the design, operation and safety-in-use of such equipment can be improved.

All information supplied to the forum is guaranteed to be handled in the strictest confidence. Information should be emailed to Intertanko who will collate the data and forward to ILAMA for review and forwarding to the appropriate manufacturers.

Intertanko and Intercargo have asked their members to inform their crews of this new opportunity to provide valuable, practical experience to manufacturers in the use of their equipment so that improvements can be made.

Information should be emailed to Intertanko at:
lifeboats@Intertanko.com

Winch accident - the Association regularly receives reports of accidents involving machinery.

In a recent case on board a tanker, a carpenter suffered severe injuries when he became entangled in the guy rope of the derricks used to handle cargo hoses.This guy rope was being wound around a rotating winch drum.

It is not entirely clear how the accident occurred, as the carpenter was operating the winch alone and without supervision so there were no eyewitnesses. Some of the crew were in the process of disconnecting the port side cargo hose after the completion of discharge. The carpenter was sent alone to the starboard derrick to adjust the guy ropes by using the winch's drum end. The carpenter was possibly trying to untangle the guy rope as it fed over the drum end but, in any event, through lack of attention, he became entangled in the rope, which dragged him around the winch drum. He suffered a fracture of a spinal vertebra in his neck.

The accident serves to emphasise the importance of risk assessment in all instances, particularly when machinery is involved. In this case the carpenter should not have attempted to operate the winch and handle the guy rope at the same time. A powered appliance should always have a person at the controls while it is in operation. There should also have been a person stationed in a position where he could clearly see the operation of both winches and could supervise their safe operation.

CONTAINERS AND CARGOES

Collapsed containers

This photograph illustrates the advantages of carrying collapsible flatracks in their collapsed position. If it is not convenient for stevedores to arrange for them to be loaded in their collapsed condition then it is especially important for ship's crews to check that locking pins for the end walls/stanchions are locked. Flat-racks ideally should be loaded on the top tier of any stack, especially if the end wall stanchions are not put into the collapsed position by the stevedores.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ballast operations

The Nautical Institute have reported how the configuration of ballast air vent lines on a container vessel resulted in a partial vacuum in one of the ballast tanks. The ballast tanks shared common air vent-cum-overflow lines. There were two overboard discharges on each line, one amidships and the other at the forward end. In port, it was standard procedure to shut the amidships overboard discharge valve on the shore side in order to avoid accidental discharge of ballast water on to the quay, shore gantry cranes and other sensitive electrical installations.

The chief officer was undertaking deep-sea ballast water exchange. The forward tanks were emptied and refilled without incident, except that the day's operations ended with an overflow. The next morning, the chief officer resumed the operations by deballasting one of the after double bottom tanks. However, on starting the pump, he observed abnormal readings on the console ammeter and pump suction and discharge manometers. The cadet also reported intense suction on opening the tank sounding pipe.

The pump was immediately stopped and investigations revealed the overflow water from the previous evening's operation had formed a water seal in the forward section of the common vent-cum-overflow line. The amidships ballast overboard discharge valve had not been opened after departure from port. As soon as the pump was started, to deballast the after double bottom tank, the residual water in the vent overflow line was sucked into the air vent line of that tank, and operated the float check valve within. This prevented air from entering the tank from either route, from vent heads on the upper deck or from the overboard discharges. It caused a partial vacuum to develop inside the tank.The problem disappeared as soon as the amidships overboard valve was opened and the residual water drained from the line.

The root cause of the accident was the failure to follow the standard procedure of opening all overboard valves after departure from port.
www.nautinst.org/mars/mars06/200660.htm

PUBLICATIONS

Chemical Tankers : A Pocket Safety Guide

A description of basic tanker safety practices for crewmembers on chemical tankers. It is aimed at personnel with little or no experience and is not a detailed operational guide.
Published 2006 price GBP10,Witherbys Publishing and Seamanship International.
10-ISBN 1 85609 324 7 and ISBN-13 978 1 85609 324 8

Fresh Air : A Guide to Confined Space Entry

Written as the 'definitive guide' to confined space entry, it is essential reading for Chief Officers on every class of vessel with completely new and up to date text.
Price GBP95,Witherbys Publishing and Seamanship International.
10-ISBN 1 58609 328 X and 13-ISBN 978 1 85609 328 6

LNG Operational Practice

A clearly laid-out manual aimed at LNG masters and officers which details all cargo-related procedures based on established good practice.
Price GBP95,Witherbys Publishing and Seamanship International.
10-ISBN 1 85609 321 2 and 13-ISBN 987 185609 321 7

Navigation for Masters : 3rd Edition

This edition written by David J House deals with all the recent technological advances in communications as well as the more traditional methods of radar, echo sounder and the three point visual bearing.
Price GBP55.
10-ISBN 1 85609 271 2 and 13-ISBN 978 185609 271 5

Wall chart : IMO Dangerous Goods, 2006

GBP8, published 12 January 2007
ISBN 978-92-801-1469-0
www.imo.org