Volume 15: Number 1: January 2008

NAVIGATION AND SEAMANSHIP

Groundings

The 2006/2007 policy year has become the year of groundings.The year is a record in terms of large claims and in terms of the number of groundings included within those large claims; 15 grounding claims in excess of US$7million each.

As one would expect, the circumstances of the groundings are varied but they are nevertheless familiar; engine failure whilst entering port, uncharted sandbanks, and simple poor navigation all feature as causes. However what is notable is that five of these claims arose from ships dragging anchor in bad weather.This figure is supplemented by another three cases of vessels not going aground but causing serious damage to pipelines or underwater cables as a result of dragging anchor.

One of the most widely publicised groundings of the year was the case of PASHA BULKER which dragged her anchor and went aground on 8 June 2007 off Newcastle, Australia. It was not clear for many days whether salvage efforts would be successful or not.

On 7 June the anchorage off Newcastle had 56 vessels within it, all of which had been receiving weather forecasts of south to south-easterly winds of 30/40 knots, gusting up to 50 knots, producing total wave heights up to 7.5 metres. Ships had started departing the anchorage during that evening and by 0700hrs on 8 June only nine ships remained.

PASHA BULKER was at anchor in 33 metres of water, 2.5nm off the coast.The Master, having received the gale forecast, elected to veer out more cable, to a total of 11 shackles on deck, rather than depart the anchorage. Significantly the Master did not take on more ballast and she remained in a light ballast condition.The first indication that PASHA BULKER was dragging came at 0650hrs and she commenced weighing anchor at 0710hrs. The anchor was aweigh at 0748hrs but by this time she was 1.2nm off the lee shore.The weather was such that despite being full ahead PASHA BULKER was only making 1 to 1.5 knots with the propeller constantly breaking the surface causing the engine to over-speed. Although steering 110º the course made good was approximately 045º.

It was some time soon after 0800hrs that the Master may have made the fatal error of altering course to between 140º and 160º in an effort to counter the northerly drift. In doing so the bow passed through the direction from which the wind was coming, the wind and the sea were now on the port bow turning the ship to starboard, on a heading of about 240º – towards the shore. Despite the helm being put hard over to port the ship was blown onto a south-westerly course and lost steerage totally for a period of about five minutes.During this period the Master considered attempting to re-anchor but conditions on deck were such that no crew could get forward. PASHA BULKER never effectively regained steerage or control and grounded at around 0950hrs.

It is worth comparing the fate of PASHA BULKER with that of SEA CONFIDENCE which was at anchor only a short distance away from PASHA BULKER. SEA CONFIDENCE had tried to weigh anchor at 0530hrs and began dragging in a north-easterly direction towards the lee shore whilst doing so.When the anchor was aweigh SEA CONFIDENCE was unable to develop enough water flow over the rudder to gain steerage and turn into the wind.The propeller was frequently breaking the surface causing the engine to over-speed. Indeed the engine shut down 25 times throughout the incident. At 0850hrs the Master commenced ballasting no. 3 hold in an effort to enhance the propeller emersion. However it would take a further eight hours to take on the 14,000 tons of ballast actually loaded. By 1205hrs SEA CONFIDENCE had already dragged 10nm and was in a precarious position being only 1nm off the shore. At this time the Master decided to let go of the port anchor with six shackles which slowed the vessel’s drift considerably.He subsequently let go the starboard anchor with three shackles. Although the cables became twisted, the use of two anchors combined with the ever increasing emersion and therefore the efficiency of the propeller was enough to hold SEA CONFIDENCE in position only seven cables from the shoreline. A tug put to sea in order to assist SEA CONFIDENCE but efforts to put a line on board had to be abandoned when two tug crewmembers were injured. Shortly after 1640hrs there was a lull in the weather and SEA CONFIDENCE was able to manoeuvre to untwist the anchor cables; both anchors were weighed and the ship proceeded to sea under her own power.

Of the Master’s many functions anchor work is probably that which is most reliant upon his seamanship skills.When and where to anchor and how to anchor are questions highly dependant upon the Master’s experience, as is when to depart an anchorage because of impending bad weather. It is clear that by 0900hrs on the morning of 8 June the vast majority of ships at anchor had already made the correct decision and departed to ride out the forecast gale at sea.The Masters of PASHA BULKER and SEA CONFIDENCE had overestimated the holding capacity of their anchors and seemed not to have predicted the effect of the foreseeable heavy pitching would have on propeller emersion and ultimately the vessels’ ability to maintain headway and steerage way.Once both vessels had started to drag it would be seamanship skills, or the lack of them,which determined the fate of the vessels. In terms of seamanship the answers are fairly obvious, noticeably where SEA CONFIDENCE had somewhat belatedly decided to take on ballast, PASHA BULKER appears not to have attempted to do so.Whereas SEA CONFIDENCE did drop both anchors and it appears that this action saved the vessel, PASHA BULKER did not consider doing so until a time when conditions made it impossible to do so. It has to be noted that neither vessel appears to have considered using two anchors at an early stage i.e. before and in anticipation of the heavy weather.Why they did not do so is not clear.

The State report from which the above details have been taken provides a graphic illustration of the disadvantages of riding to a single anchor in strong winds. Ships’ yaw and sway are substantial when at a single anchor and forces on the constantly slackening and tightening cable increase and decrease rapidly.

Although not mentioned in the report, Masters are no doubt also aware of the relatively short distance of travel astern that a vessel has to make to cause a cable that is ‘up and down’ to become taut and which, then, has the potential to break out the anchor. If the depth of water is only one shackle with five shackles of cable out, a ship only has to move 25 metres astern before the cable becomes taut. (Nautical Institute Monograph: Anchoring Large Vessels - a New Approach by Capt C A McDowall). Clearly with such heavy winds and high seas this was a possibility in the case of the subject vessels even though they may have had more than five shackles out.This is especially true given that their ballast condition would have increased their pitching motion significantly.

PASHA BULKER ran aground causing significant damage to the hull and incurring what is likely to be expensive salvage charges but ultimately no lives were lost, thanks to great efforts by Australian Search & Rescue Authorities.No significant pollution occurred and the ship was ultimately saved.However, this is not typical of large claims affecting P&I and indeed the cost of each of the eight anchor dragging incidents referred to in this article will exceed US$7 million with the most expensive incident costing in the region of US$31 million. It is not clear whether shortage of crews and supposed reduction in crew standards are actually resulting in an increased number of groundings (relative to the increased world fleet) but it is clear they are becoming increasingly more expensive. The nurturing and retention of old fashioned seamanship skills should not be undervalued.

www.maritime.nsw.gov.au/docs/pasha_ bulker_final_report.pdf

When at anchor, and a gale is forecast or experienced, a Master has a number of options to consider.These include:

• weighing anchor and proceeding to sea to ride out the bad weather;
• veering more cable to increase the holding capability of the anchor and its cable’;
• letting go a second anchor to increase the combined holding power and reduce the movement about a single anchor;
• using the ship’s engine to steam onto the anchor and reduce the strain on the anchor and its cable, and;
• further, depending upon the relative strength of current and wind/wave action, ballasting to heavy weather ballast conditions should be considered.

The State report into PASHA BULKER grounding raised the issue of whether loading terminal demands on deballasting times were influential on the Master’s decision not to take on more ballast.The report concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that this was the case but nevertheless stated that the terminal’s ‘Suitability List’ and the implicit restrictions on deballasting times may constitute a commercial pressure.This is an issue that will hopefully be addressed further in the Australian Maritime Safety Authority investigation which has yet to be published.

Regulatory update

Criminal liability underMARPOL: Practical considerations

We are grateful to William J. Pallas, Partner at Freehill, Hogan & Mahar LLP for this article about ways to help avoid criminal liability arising from violations of MARPOL or other environmental statutes.

The easiest way to avoid criminal liability is to avoid committing a violation in the first place. However, the reality is that companies are ultimately at the mercy of the weakest link in their chain of employment.The result is that the reckless and illegal conduct of a ‘rogue’ engineer could potentially give rise to millions of dollars in criminal fines and other expenses for the company.Nevertheless, there are some practical steps that may be taken by vessel management and officers onboard to at least minimize, if not eliminate, the potential for criminal liability on the part of the owner and operator.

Management
In today’s maritime industry, almost all ships operate under detailed SMS requirements dictating the procedures for handling and disposing of waste oil. It would be the rare owner/operator who would not be able to point to very clear written policies prohibiting vessel crews from making illegal discharges or otherwise violating the requirements of MARPOL. However, these policies on their own are not sufficient to avoid vicarious liability for violations by the company’s employees. Ultimately, the policies are only as effective as their enforcement.Thus, in order to demonstrate actual enforcement of the company’s environmental policies to port state control inspectors, vessel managers should consider the following recommendations:

• Vigorous self auditing: The most effective way to demonstrate enforcement of company policies is by conducting audits of the company’s vessels and crews.The audits may be conducted internally, or even better, by means of third parties. If a port state control investigator or a prosecutor deems the audit to be superficial, they will not have any value. Thus, it is essential that the audits have legitimacy.To the extent the audits reveal deficiencies, such deficiencies must be addressed, and if appropriate, disciplinary action should be taken against the responsible crewmembers. For example, if a fleet-wide audit were to reveal widespread evidence of ‘sloppy’ record keeping, one would expect the company to provide training to its officers to rectify the problem. The company may also issue letters of reprimand, or even take more significant disciplinary action, against the worst violators.

• Improve Internal Record keeping: Port state control inspectors seem to be particularly interested where there are inconsistencies between the various records maintained by engine room personnel, i.e. oil record book versus soundings log, etc.The company should develop record keeping procedures such that crews can accurately determine and keep track of waste production and disposal. For example, there are very effective and efficient spreadsheets which can be used to reconcile soundings in all the waste oil tanks with the entries in the ORB and soundings log.The spreadsheet is required to be maintained by the Chief Engineer and submitted to shoreside management on a monthly basis.

• Establish Safeguards to Ensure Accountability with Respect to Overboard Discharges: Management should adopt procedures by which access to and utilization of overboard discharge equipment, valves, etc. is closely restricted and monitored. Examples of such a mechanism would be a policy where all overboard discharge valves are equipped with individual tags and locking mechanisms, the keys to which are maintained by the Master and must be logged in and out by the Chief Engineer. Additional measures may include requiring the status of pollution prevention equipment to be addressed in hand-over notes.

• Improving Communications between Crews and Shoreside Management: The company should encourage internal reporting, including the implementation of a ‘hot line’ allowing crewmembers to easily report any possible problems to an appropriate officer. Crewmembers should be encouraged and rewarded for reporting violations of company policy.

Engineering
There are also a number of engineering steps which may help to reduce the likelihood of a MARPOL violation:

• Companies should consider upgrading their oily water separator (OWS), oil content sensor, incinerator and other related pollution control equipment. If such equipment is reliable and user friendly, crewmembers will be less inclined to invent creative ways to avoid using it;

• Vessels should use cleaning agents that are consistent with OWS technology;

• Bilge/ballast crossovers and blank flanges should be eliminated;

• Freshwater flushing systems should be modified so that they cannot be used to ‘trick’ the oil content meter on the OWS;

• As discussed above, locking mechanisms and individual tags for overboard discharge valves should be used to eliminate unauthorized discharges.

Training
Whether justified or not, there exists a common perception among port state control authorities that the frequency of MARPOL violations reflects a failure on the part of the industry to make crewmembers and other employees understand the importance of MARPOL compliance. The aggressive enforcement measures taken by the United States Department of Justice are ultimately aimed at bringing about a change in the culture of the industry. Thus, the issue of training is significant, not only to avoid the violations in the first place, but also to demonstrate that the company does not condone violations by its employees.

• MARPOL Training: Crewmembers should be provided with extensive training regarding the requirements of MARPOL and company environmental policy upon joining the company. All employees should be provided with follow-up training on an annual basis.

• Crewmember Affidavits: Crewmembers could be required to execute affidavits upon completion of training attesting that they have been instructed in the requirements of MARPOL and the company’s environmental policies. As part of those affidavits, the crewmembers should acknowledge that they are aware that the company maintains a zero tolerance policy for environmental violations and that any such violation will be deemed to be outside of their scope of employment and grounds for immediate dismissal.

• Environmental Compliance: Environmental compliance should be awarded as a positive factor in personnel evaluations.

• Recognition of Legal Rights/Obligations on the Part of Crew Members: The potential for criminal liability arising whenever there is an environmental incident or casualty makes it imperative that crew members have some basic understanding of their legal rights and obligations when interacting with port state control authorities. The most fundamental concept to be impressed upon crew members faced with a potential criminal investigation is that they have the right to decline to speak with the authorities and request an attorney, but if they elect to speak with the authoritites, they must tell the truth, or else face potential obstruction and false statement charges.

While it may not be possible to completely eliminate the risk of criminal prosecution for violations of environmental laws, it is hoped that the above measures may go a long way to minimizing the risk and mitigating the consequences.

Compulsory pilotage for the Torres Strait?

IMO Resolution MEPC.133(53) recognises the establishment of a two-way route through the Torres Strait. It also recommends that governments recognise the need to protect the Torres Strait and that governments inform all ships flying their flag that they should act in accordance with Australia’s ‘Revised Pilotage Requirement for Torres Strait’:

http://www.amsa.gov.au/Shipping_Safety/ Marine_Notices/2006/Documents/0806.pdf

This pilotage system applies to ships of 70 metres or more in length and to all oil tankers, chemical tankers and liquefied gas carriers irrespective of size.

Notwithstanding this recommendation from the IMO, the international community does not recognise Australia’s authority to impose compulsory pilotage within these international waters.

Whilst the matter remains unresolved the UK Maritime & Coastguard Agency is advising all UK registered vessels transiting the Torres Strait and Great North East Channel to comply with the recommendation in MEPC.133(53) and, on a voluntary basis, engage a pilot if the vessel is a merchant ship of 70 metres in length or more, or an oil tanker, chemical tanker or liquefied gas carrier irrespective of size (see Marine Information Notice (MIN 308(M)) for further details www.mcga.gov.uk). Members are therefore advised against treating Torres Strait pilotage as anything other than compulsory.

Details of the pilotage arrangements for the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel are contained in Admiralty Sailing Directions – Australia Pilot Vol. III(NP15) and Admiralty List of Radio Signals Vol. 6(4).

Containers and cargoes

Ore – continuing problems with water content

The Association is still receiving reports of vessels loading nickel ore with high water content, notably from ports in the Philippines. It is worthwhile reminding Masters and crews of the article which appeared in the July 2006 edition of Risk Watch (Volume 13 Number 3).

Liquefaction of bulk ore can occur during a voyage. The normal vibration of the vessel causes the solid ore to transform into fluid form, with potentially serious consequences for ship stability. The problem is particularly acute in ports that stockpile the ore in open conditions, such as those in the Philippines.

As moisture content certificates can be unreliable the Association recommends that tests on the cargo are carried out to determine the risk of liquefaction. Such tests should be carried out prior to loading. In the Philippines loading often takes place from barges, so there is plenty of opportunity to carry out the tests.

The ‘can test’ is a simple method of determining whether a sample is liable to liquefy. For the test, a sample of about a kilogram of the cargo to be loaded is placed in a suitable tin can (empty paint or food cans are ideal). The can is then slammed down against a hard surface 60 times over a period of two minutes. If the ore sample remains unaltered in form, it may be considered safe. If signs of liquefaction are noted, the ore should not be loaded.

Surveyors Messrs. Minton Treharne & Davies have much experience of dealing with such matters and have produced a useful DVD explaining the risks of carriage and describing the ‘can test’. To obtain a copy, please contact them via their website at www.minton.co.uk or by email at mtd@minton.co.uk. Alternatively a copy may be obtained from the Association.

Stop press

A recent warning from BIMCO reports that three ships have had problems when carrying cargoes of iron fines. All three vessels loaded the iron ore fines in India and encountered serious stability problems at sea when the cargo shifted in the holds due to cargo liquefaction. Two of the ships had to be beached when they began to list (by up to 20º) as the cargo began to move.

Hot work with sealed containers

The Association warns of the danger of conducting hot work on shipper-packed sealed containers. An incident has recently occurred where a section of steel supporting the floor of the container had dropped below the level of the lower corner castings such that the container could not be secured to a chassis using twist locks. The repair yard used a gas torch to cut the frame which resulted in the unit catching fire, destroying a significant amount of cargo inside. In this case the cargo was properly listed on the manifest as a nonhazardous consignment. As there is always the risk of some cargoes being mis-declared it is not good practice to conduct hot work on shipper sealed containers. It is inadvisable to undertake any hot work on loaded containers, irrespective of the IMDG Code status of the cargo.

Collapsed containers

In a previous edition of Risk Watch (Volume 14: Number 2 April 2007) we reported the need for ships’ crew to ensure that the locking pins on collapsible containers are properly locked while on board.

The diagram below illustrates a so-called ‘super rack’. It is a flat rack container on which the corner posts can be extended. The advantage of this type of container is that when carrying ‘over-height’ cargo, the corner posts can be extended (above the top of the cargo), allowing the container to be lifted with a conventional container spreader. Unfortunately, the Association has had experience of such containers collapsing. Crews must ensure that all post locking pins and Domino locking pins are locked on all four corners to avoid the posts collapsing or an uneven lift that could result in the loss of cargo from the rack. This type of damage can be avoided if the clear instructions shown near each corner post are followed.

Miscellaneous

Publications

ICS Bridge Procedures Guide
The International Chamber of Shipping has published a new edition of the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide.The new edition reflects the increased use of modern electronic charting systems and communications.New guidance on pilotage is also included. As usual the ICS Guide contains some very useful and comprehensive checklists.The Guide,which includes an accompanying CD version with ‘search function’, costs GB£60 (including worldwide postage and packing) and is available through the usual maritime book sellers or via www.marisec.org/pubs

Managing Collision Avoidance at Sea
The Nautical Institute has recently published this practical and informative book written by Captain Gilbert W U Lee and Julian Parker.The book addresses the fact that collisions are now on the increase and the consequences are significantly greater as large ships are now more interdependent in transport systems and the penalties for pollution have become much more severe. It points out that collision avoidance is a cooperative responsibility and all parties, both ashore and afloat,must work together to seek improvement. Both authors have many years of practical experience and Julian Parker is well-known to many as Former Secretary of the Nautical Institute, a post which he held from 1972 to 2003.

The book costs GB£27.50 for Non-NI members and £19.25 for members. For all orders, please contact:

The Publications Officer
The Nautical Institute
202 Lambeth Road
London SE1 7LQ
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7928 1351
Fax: +44(0)20 7401 2817

Shipping Industry Guidance on Environmental Compliance – A framework for ensuring compliance with MARPOL
This guidance has been prepared by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) as a template for the review of company compliance programmes adopted in accordance with existing regulatory requirements, such as the International Maritime Organisation (ISM) Code.This framework is also supported by BIMCO, Intercargo, Intertanko,OCIMF and SIGTTO.

To view and print a copy of the Environmental Compliance Guide go to www.marisec.org/environmental-compliance/

Fines in Argentina for non-declaration of bunkers and lub oils onboard

The Association’s correspondents in Argentina have warned of many instances when Customs Authorities are being particularly strict about the amount of bunkers and lub oil being declared.The Customs Authorities are meticulously measuring the quantities of bunkers and lub oils onboard and comparing those exact quantities with the amounts declared.Members should also be aware that the Association has experience where, when Customs Authorities have failed to find discrepancies between actual and declared figures for bunkers or lubs, they have turned their attention to other stores items, such as engine room chemicals and paint. Such actions are sometimes accompanied by requests for payment of fines in cash. It is recommended that Members seek the urgent advice of the local correspondents when such demands are made.

Masters should ensure that the declared stores list is as accurate as possible and that a copy of the declared stores list is retained on board and is readily identifiable as a true copy of the list which was declared to Customs.

Editor’smessage
We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk