Volume 15: Number 2: May 2008

NAVIGATION AND SEAMANSHIP

A test of seamanship

Following the last edition of Risk Watch, in which we considered the growing number of grounding claims arising from anchor dragging,we now highlight the circumstances of another vessel dragging anchor as described in an official government report.

The report provides a useful insight into the decision making process of the Master and where it failed. As in many such cases the consequences of anchor dragging were catastrophic but fortunately, on this occasion, only in financial terms and not in terms of loss of life, personal injury or pollution.

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report into the fouling of the vessel’s anchor on the Central Area Transmission System (CATS) Everest gas pipe line criticised the shore-side authorities‘ and government departments’ roles in relation to nomination of the anchorage areas, communications and response to the incident.The report identifies few failings on the part of the ship owner.Nevertheless it was ultimately the Master’s seamanship which was lacking and in this respect the report makes valuable reading for navigators.

The vessel, an aframax tanker, arrived in ballast off the mouth of the River Tees and let go her port anchor at 22:00 hours on the 24 June. The Master had previously contacted Tees Ports VTS requesting a designated anchorage and was advised that there was no designated anchorage in Tees Bay but that ships of similar size normally anchored in the vicinity of two spoil ground areas to the east of the entrance.The VTS advised the Master to keep well clear of the pipelines in an area adjacent to the spoil ground. After anchoring the Master received confirmation fromTees Ports VTS that his position ‘was fine’.The vessel anchored with seven shackles on deck, the windlass was taken out of gear and the manual compressor bar left over the cable but not secured in position.

By midday the following morning wind speeds were in excess of 30 knots.The Master had previously received forecasts of this as well as a recent forecast that wind forces would be increasing.The Master subsequently slackened the anchor cable so that there were 8 shackles on deck.

Shortly after 20:00 hours the wind speed increased to 40 knots, gusting to 48 knots. The Third Officer, on watch, had been diligent and was checking his position by several methods. At 22:00 hours the Third Officer noted that the vessel was lying outside her swinging circle and informed the Master.The main engine was ready for use relatively quickly - at 22:16 - but by that time the vessel had dragged a distance of 0.8 nautical miles at a rate of 3 knots towards the Everest gas pipeline. At the same time the Chief Officer and two seaman had commenced heaving the port anchor cable.

At this time the vessel was pitching heavily under a northerly swell estimated to be in excess of 5 metres and was yawing in excess of 70° from north-west to north-east. Predictably the Chief Officer reported that heaving was very slow because of the weight on the cable.

The first engine movement,‘dead slow ahead’, was recorded at 22:23, at which time the ship’s head was recorded as swinging between 068° and 320° and seas were breaking over the forecastle.The vessel continued to drag in a southerly direction. At 22:28 hours the engine was put to slow ahead and shortly thereafter the vessel started moving over the ground in a northerly direction. It should be noted that at this stage the Master was reluctant to use greater engine power as he feared the vessel might run over the anchor cable. By 22:40 hours the drift had been arrested but the vessel had now dragged a total of 1.3 nautical miles and lay only 2 cables north of the charted Everest gas pipeline. At 22:50,with the main engine set at ‘half ahead’ and three shackles in the water, the Chief Officer decided that there was too much weight on the cable and to apply the brake and hold on. As the brake was being applied,whilst still in gear but with the control lever in a neutral position, the hydraulic motor unit suffered a catastrophic failure.The cable ran out immediately and the brake lining disintegrated, giving off smoke and sparks, and high pressure hydraulic oil sprayed over the forecastle.

As the port cable paid out to the bitter end, a total of 12 shackles, the vessel drifted quickly south, over the gas pipeline.The drift was stopped only when the anchor fouled the pipeline.The vessel was still yawing in excess of 100 degrees and at the extremity of one yaw the anchor freed itself from the pipeline, 10 minutes after being fouled. She then began to drag towards the lee shore.

Luckily as the vessel passed over a shoal area the anchor held in a position 2n.m. off the lee shore at 23:28 hours.The Master attempted to slip the anchor but, because of the weight on the cable, could not do so until the damaged windlass hydraulic motor had been replaced. It took in excess of 12 hours to slip the anchor.

Choice of Anchorage/Seamanship
The Admiralty Sailing Direction for this area (NP57) advised against anchoring in north or easterly gales and prohibited anchoring within 2.5 cables of the Everest pipeline. BA chart 2567 reiterated this message.The charted depth at the anchorage was 32m and the height of tide was 4.5m.

The Master was aware of the Admiralty Sailing Direction and of the deteriorating weather conditions.Nevertheless he chose to remain at the anchorage.He was unaware that the quality of the holding grounding was at best moderate.The Master elected to use seven shackles on deck though he later increased this to 8 shackles.There are two commonly used formulae for calculating the number of shackles required.

1) Number of shackles of cable = 1.5 x √ Depth in metres,

or;

2) Length of cable in metres = 6 to 10 x the depth in metres.

As the depth was approximately 36m the formulae required the Master to utilise 9 shackles or 8-13 shackles respectively. He underestimated the length of cable necessary in the weather conditions. If, as in this case, less cable is used, the effects of yawing caused by the wind and the effect of pitching caused by the swell greatly increase the risk of snatch loads being applied to the anchor and that the cable will be lifted off the seabed with a resultant pull causing the anchor to trip. The fact that the vessel was in ballast condition and had a considerable windage resulted in the ‘sailing’ effect being significant.

The report states that ultimately the most seaman-like approach was to weigh anchor and ride out the storm at sea (this was the approach followed earlier that evening by other vessels in the anchorage).The report further states that the Master had failed to use the main engine in a positive and committed fashion. It was 29½ minutes after dragging was first identified and 16½ minutes after the main engine was available to him before the first positive,‘slow ahead’,main engine movement was ordered.When the Master used ‘half ahead’, the AIS recordings indicated that the rate of drift was reduced considerably.

In the circumstances, since the windlass was clearly struggling, the more seaman-like option would have been to secure the anchor at the time 3 shackles were in the water and then attempt to dredge the anchor northwards using the main engine.

At that time however, the Master continued to manoeuvre with massive loads on the windlass machinery.With 3 shackles in the water there was no catenary (curvature) on the cable to absorb those massive loads and ultimately the hydraulic motor suffered catastrophic failure and the cable ran out to the bitter end.

Windlass Operating System
The vessel was fitted with KAHC-14 stockless Bower anchors of 8.7 tonnes each. This anchor has 2.5 to 3 times the holding power of a standard stockless anchor of equal weight. Each windlass was rated at 34.5 tonnes at 9m per minute (the hydraulic system was fitted with two-in-line relief valves but there was no relief valve fitted to the hydraulic motor itself ). Prior to the incident the windlass and the break linings were all in good condition. The report stressed the importance of the Classification rules in respect of anchoring equipment which states:‘The equipment required is the minimum considered necessary for temporary mooring of a vessel in moderate sea conditions when the vessel is awaiting berth and tide etc. The equipment is therefore not designed to hold a vessel off fully exposed coasts in rough weather or for frequent anchoring operations in open sea. In such conditions the loads on the anchoring equipment will increase to such a degree that its components may be damaged or lost owing to the high energy forces generated.’

Classification requirements are based on current speeds of 2.5m per second,wind speed of 25m per second and a scope of chain (the ratio between length of chain paid out and water depth) of between 6 and 10. Anchoring equipment, as required by the rules, is designed to hold a vessel in good holding ground. Inspection of the vessel’s windlass showed that it suffered massive shock loading in the region of 800 bar, nearly 4 times the normal operating pressure.

The report found that the Master had failed to adequately address the risk of windlass failure, noting that the provision to the Master of meaningful ship-specific data for the anchoring equipment might have helped him recognise earlier that the weather conditions were becoming marginal for the design limitations of the equipment.

The report went on to draw attention to the OCIMF guide, Anchoring Systems and Procedures for Large Tankers,which provides excellent guidance to Masters of larger vessels.The report encourages Owners and Masters to develop a contingency plan that allows the cable to be slipped safely whilst the bitter end is under tension.

It is recommended that navigating officers read the full report of the MAIB into this incident; it can be found at: www.maib.gov.uk (Report – Young Lady)

Risk management on the bridge

The incidence of casualties where a pilot is onboard is attracting ever increasing attention and a recently released report by the USCG provides useful insight into one such casualty.

In February 2008,whilst under pilotage, departing from Baltimore, the bulk carrier MONTROSE ran aground in the Chesapeake Bay.The USCG report of investigation concluded that the main reasons for the grounding were inattention and fatigue on the part of the pilot, and failure to follow good Resource Management by the ship’s navigators.What was of more concern was the observation that the pilot refused to sign the pilot card because of his apparent extensive experience of the local area, and that the duty officer was subsequently hesitant in challenging the pilot’s actions prior to the grounding because of the latter’s ‘strong personality’.

This, unfortunately, is not an uncommon problem, as mariners around the world are only too well aware. A pilot is supposed to be on board to provide navigational guidance, subject to the Master’s overall command, but this directive is often ignored by pilots and the bridge team.Watch keepers, especially junior officers, are not always confident enough in their own abilities to be able to challenge an order made by the pilot. Even an experienced officer can be slow to challenge a pilot if unsure of the planned route, or if the pilot responds negatively or aggressively to any queries.

As it happens, the Master of the MONTROSE had been on the bridge until about 45 minutes prior to the grounding, and although the duty officer suspected that the ship’s course and position were doubtful, he did not question the pilot or notify the Master.

The pilot’s communication with the bridge team had been restricted to issuing helm and course orders.

All went well until the pilot sat down in the pilots’ chair, and is believed to have lost attention.

The vessel was supposed to alter course to starboard after passing the CR buoy, at about 0548, but the pilot gave no order to do so.

The duty officer then went to the chart table to plot the position, but the vessel ran aground at about 0600.

It should have been obvious that an alteration of course was required after passing the buoy, and the duty officer should have been aware of this fact without having to refer to a charted position.

Accidents are expensive. A seemingly minor problem in communication can lead to a vessel hitting a dock or running aground. Apart from the time lost whilst freeing and repairing the vessel, an accident can give rise to claims for pollution, criminal liability, repair bills, loss of hire, cargo transhipment, salvage and wreck removal.

A responsible vessel operator will have effective policies in place to man and operate a vessel efficiently. All too often however, simply having and implementing policy is not enough. A Master needs to know that his genuine efforts and actions are going to be backed by his shipowner. A bridge watch keeper needs to know that he can, if in any doubt, question a pilot’s actions,with his manager’s full support.This is where effective bridge team management comes in.

One of Britannia’s Members has specifically instructed and trained ship staff to challenge pilots if they feel that the ship is being put into danger.This is positive action (and can only be applauded), however in order for this to work, all ship staff must be given adequate training by means of role play and practical training ashore. It is not easy for a second or third officer to countermand the pilot’s actions, but if he has to wait for the Master to get on the bridge before questioning the pilot, it may well be too late.

Risk Management is a process of analysing events that may disrupt a business and determining how best to handle these risks, whilst still achieving targeted goals. In other words, ANALYSE – MINIMISE – REALISE.

Risk assessment in bridge team management should include:

• the duty officer verifying that the berth to berth passage plan remains relevant to the voyage,with current hazards identified and the potential danger minimised;

• a bridge team pre-arrival and pre-departure meeting,where all participants are made fully aware of the likely deployment of pilots, route, lines, tugs, and weather conditions.

Every day brings a different combination of challenges, so each new or routine task needs to be adequately risk assessed.

MAIB publishes report on MSC Napoli

The UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), has just published its report on the investigation of the structural failure of the container vessel MSC NAPOLI in the English Channel in January 2007.The report highlights problems in the design and construction of the vessel and the overloading of containers which contributed to the casualty. The full report can be found at: www.maib.gov.uk/publications/index.cfm

Containers and cargoes

Canola

Canola (Canadian Oil Low Acid) is a variety of rape distinguished by the lower acidic content of its oil. Canola is becoming an increasingly important cash crop in North America, especially Canada.There is nothing especially unusual about Canola, except perhaps some unfamiliarity with the name, and how it should be carried. It is, however,worth noting that Canola is not in the BC Code.

While Canola seed is not specifically listed in the BC Code as a dangerous cargo, expellers, rapeseed cake and pellets,which also have a tendency to spontaneously heat, are listed in the Code. It is advisable to refer to the relevant section of the BC code for all these cargoes before carrying Canola seed as a cargo.

Canola cargo is particularly susceptible to excessive moisture content: the risks involved are two-fold;

Should the moisture content of the Canola seed cargo be excessively high there is a risk that over the duration of the voyage the seed could develop mould and be rejected on quality grounds at the receiving port; and

There is a potential risk of spontaneous heating: at a temperature level of just 15°C, with a seed moisture level of 12% or above, the cargo can become very unstable, leading to spontaneous heating. Excessive waste or ‘trash’, (as waste material in grain cargoes are often called) contained within the cargo and the presence of live insects, can exacerbate the problem. Should the cargo sit on top of heated fuel tanks, there is a real risk of any potential overheating problem becoming greatly enhanced.

Ideally the moisture content of the cargo should be kept between approximately 7.5% and 8%, and the temperature of the Canola seed cargo be kept at around 20°C, to ensure no risk of quality deterioration or spontaneous heating.

It is recommended that the moisture levels of cargo upon loading are checked to ensure that these are below 8%.The cargo should also be ventilated on the trip, especially when the cargo is being transported from a temperate climate, for example Canada, to a more tropical climate, for example Pakistan. It should be remembered that the principal origins of the cargo are Canada and the United States, and the principal destinations of the cargo are Japan, China, Pakistan and Mexico. It is therefore probable that in most instances the cargo is being transported from a temperate zone to a more tropical zone.

Slip Hazard
The Canola seed is very small, between approximately 1 and 2 millimetres in diameter, and is extremely hard; indeed the Canola seed can be considered as being similar to a ball bearing. Should a seaman inadvertently walk over some loose seeds on the deck, there is a risk of slipping,which could result in a serious injury, especially if the vessel is at sea.

It is suggested that any spillage on deck, irrespective of amount, be swept clean at the earliest convenient time.

Richards Bay – high value ores

Members operating bulk carriers will be familiar with Richards Bay as one of the leading coal export ports.The port is, however, increasingly used for the export of higher value ores such as chrome and copper concentrate. Similarly, there is an increase in export of mineral sand such as Rutile and Zircon.We have been reminded by Captain G A Chettle & Associates, Richards Bay, that all products should not be treated in the same manner as coal or iron ore with regard to pre-loading hull cleanliness.These specialist ores are very sensitive to contamination, especially by rust scale, and standards of descaling which would satisfy many bulk coal and iron ore cargoes would not be acceptable to shippers of such specialist ores. Even higher standards may apply to some of the mineral sands, especially Zircon sand,where it even may be necessary for areas of rust to be wire brushed.

Captain G A Chettle & Associates has drawn up a brief guide to highlight the standards of hull cleanliness required for the carriage of the ores and mineral sands exported from Richards Bay. The guide is available from the Association.

Revised guidelines for container securing manuals and compulsory training ashore

Members and their crews will recall a previous article in Risk Watch (Volume 14 :Number 4 October 2007) which featured the loss of containers from the ANNABELLA and the subsequent UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation. A draft IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) circular giving Revised Guidelines for the preparation of the Cargo Securing Manual was agreed by the IMO Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC) at its meeting in Autumn 2007.

At the same meeting the reducing incidence of deficiencies in cargo transport units (CTUs) carrying dangerous goods in the 2007 consolidated report on container inspection programmes, compared to the previous year’s consolidated report,was noted.The DSC agreed that the mandatory training of shore-side personnel and future work on revision of the International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) in the context of container examination programmes were both positive measures that would further improve the situation.

Regulatory update

US Authorities reminded to show respect to seafarers

Most seafarers are familiar with the heavy handed approach of some coastguard and other authorities when boarding vessels.The increased vigilance of the US Coastguard since 9/11 has perhaps resulted in an attitude towards seafarers by US Coastguards which is inappropriate.This has been recognised by the US Coastguard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen in a circular dated 29 February to all US Coastguard offices and unit commanders.The circular reads as follows:

Subject: Commandant’s expectations for interaction with maritime industry

USCG activities involving US and foreign professional mariners and maritime organizations will be conducted with utmost professionalism and respect. Licensed and documented mariners are professionals who share our interests in a safe, secure, and environmentally compliant industry.Alexander Hamilton’s charge - to keep in mind that our countrymen are free men, and as such, are impatient of everything that bears the least mark of a domineering spirit - applies as much today as it did in 1790 and equally to international mariners and our trading partners.

Unfortunately I have received reports from highly respected professionals recounting Coast Guard boardings, inspections, and investigations not displaying professionalism. Additionally, some have said they lost the complete trust they once had in the Coast Guard and are fearful of retribution if they challenge the Coast Guard’s conduct.

We must change this perception. America’s position in the global economy, public and environmental safety, and post 9/11 security are at stake.The need for maritime industrygovernment cooperation and partnership has never been more important.The Coast Guard’s obligation to the safety and security of America is shared by the maritime industry and enhanced by working cooperatively with industry at all levels.Openness and transparency will be the hallmarks of our maritime interaction.

Boarding team members,marine inspectors, port state control examiners, facility examiners and their supervisors shall encourage open communication with mariners and other members of industry.

Disruption in the normal flow of commerce impacts many parties in the supply chain.We have clearly established appeal procedures when we make a decision that could have negative impacts on a licensed mariner or on the maritime industry.The exercise of appeal is a right we strongly support.Questions, differences of professional opinion, and appeals are normal and improve the conduct of business.We must be as accepting of these as praise. Attempt to resolve problems at the lowest level possible and be resourceful in doing so.

In instances when decisions are appealed, unit commanders and supervisors must act with a neutral common sense attitude; timely resolution is of utmost importance to facilitating legitimate commerce.

As commandant, I actively engage the Captains of the maritime industry in round table discussions to uncover what is good and bad with our current practices so improvements can be made. I expect similar maritime industry engagement at every level of the Coast Guard followed by aggressive action to address problem areas. Follow ethics, rules and standards of conduct in your interactions.

As soon as possible,USCG sector commanders shall solicit candid feedback from the individual mariners, industry association reps, and facility operators who have a significant stake in marine safety, security, and stewardship.This feedback shall identify pending issues needing action, best practices, and recommendations that can be acted upon.Districts shall hold a sector conference to include COTP/OCMI, prevention and response reps to discuss the feedback, determine a course of action for those that merit action and then close the loop with industry on actions taken.National level recommendations shall be vetted through area commanders and forwarded to the assistant commandant for marine safety, security and stewardship (CG-5) by 1 June 2008 for consideration in the Coast Guard’s marine safety improvement efforts.My goal is to purge the past and reset for the future.Open communication, critical self-examination, and a willing transparency are hallmarks of great organizations, including the Coast Guard.

I also expect USCG sector commanders and cutter commanding officers to ensure boarding teams, inspectors, and examiners provide the unit’s senior leader contact information, if asked, to vessel Masters, port engineers, and facility operators.

Effective immediately, Coast Guard requirements that limit vessel movement (such as no sail orders,major CGg-835s, actions that would delay arrivals and departures) are to be affirmed by the sector CID and reported to the prevention chief, as many already do. At a minimum, a Coast Guard supervisor shall engage, by phone, radio, or in person with the Master, port engineer, or facility manager to discuss the requirements and expectations for resolution. As soon as practicable, USCG sector commanders,MSU commanding officers, and cutter commanding officers shall be informed of all such discussions.

Declaration of defective navigation equipment: US Port State Control issue a clarification

Port State Control Branch USCG Sector Houston Galveston has issued clarification concerning the requirement to report inoperative navigation equipment by vessels arriving in Houston. Some vessels have been placing a statement on their Electronic Notice of Arrivals (ENOAs) to the effect that certain navigation equipment is not functioning.

Whilst this is a requirement under 33 CFR 164.53 it is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the USCG. Under the terms of 33 CFR 164.55 a written request (application) for an approved ‘deviation’ – effectively permission to enter the port without fully functioning navigation equipment – must also be made.Vessels found in port with a navigation equipment deficiency and without a Captain of the Port approved deviation, are liable to civil penalty action by the Coast Guard.

Miscellaneous

53ft Containers: suitable for carriage by sea?

Earlier this year,whilst conducting a routine inspection of the containers on deck during heavy weather, the Master of a Member’s vessel observed that there were apparent signs of distortion and structural failure to some 53’ containers.

The 53’ containers in question were stacked on top of 40’ units, in a manner not recommended by the manufacturer, and this had resulted in excessive stresses on the unsupported ends.The 53’ containers were clearly marked ‘Type Domestic Container’ which would indicate that they are not constructed for the carriage of cargo on ocean transit.The 53’ unit is commonly used on USA rail and road transport networks.

There are no conventional container vessels currently specifically designed for the carriage of 53’ units, and there are many container vessels which could not accommodate the 53’ units. Allowable stacking is three units high, but on this vessel many units were stowed four high on top of two 40’ containers.These containers are also over width at 8.5’wide, which means that additional adjustments have to be made to stow them. Lashing bars have to be fitted to the corner castings to counteract additional racking stresses, particularly in heavy weather.

The vessel in question had encountered heavy weather conditions enroute, and the stresses from the weight on the overhanging ends of the 53’ units coupled with the racking stresses from the lashing bars and the heavy weather, had resulted in considerable structural damage to a number of the units. The fact that the containers were loaded with considerable weight at the overhanging ends certainly contributed to the damages.The Master and Chief Officer acted in a prudent manner, adjusting speed and course to alleviate the vessels rolling and pitching.

As conventional container vessels are unable to accommodate 53’ units under deck, the only stowage possible is on deck, and there are a limited number of vessels capable of stowing them on deck.The safest stowage position would be directly on top of the hatch covers so the full length of the container is supported, but the construction of many container vessels would not accommodate this stowage as the ends of the containers would invariably overlap adjacent bays.

Members are reminded of the importance of checking containers being loaded on their vessels, and in particular, out of gauge or oversize units. Another relevant stability issue is that the onboard stability computer is not configured for these special containers,which means that the calculated stresses are, at best, a good guess.

Publications

New environmental compliance guidance

This new publication from the ICS and ISF is a response to the continuing incidence of prosecutions for MARPOL violations especially in the USA. Entitled, Shipping Industry Guidance on Environmental Compliance, the guide acts as a template for ensuring adherence to the IMO MARPOL Convention, in accordance with ISM Code requirements.

The Industry Guidance has been designed to link with the US Coast Guard’s new Voluntary Disclosure Policy. Under this policy if environmental incidents are reported by a company which can demonstrate a fully documented environmental compliance system – such as set out in the guidance – this will be taken into consideration.

The Industry Guidance is being distributed free of charge by ISC/ICF national associations but can also be downloaded from http://www.marisec.org/environmentalcompliance/index.htm

IMO publishes new GMDSS manual

The new manual, published by the IMO, is a complete revision of its comprehensive handbook on the global maritime distress and safety system (GMDSS).The intent of the new GMDSS Manual is to provide a single comprehensive publication containing an explanation of the principles on which GMDSS is based, the operational performance standards and technical specifications to be met by GMDSS equipment and the procedures and method of operation of that equipment.

The manual is available from most authorised distributors of IMO publications and the IMO’s on-line bookshop www.imo.org